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General Assembly
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Agenda items 35 and 40**Security Council**
Seventy-third year**Protracted conflicts in the GUAM area and their implications
for international peace, security and development****The situation in the occupied territories of Azerbaijan****Letter dated 12 January 2018 from the Permanent
Representative of Azerbaijan to the United Nations addressed
to the Secretary-General**

Upon instructions from my Government, I have the honour to convey herewith the records of violations of the ceasefire by the Republic of Armenia in November and December 2017 (see annexes I and II).^{*} During the two months of the reporting period, Armenia violated the ceasefire regime 3,716 and 4,014 times, respectively, and continued the use of large-calibre guns and heavy weaponry from its positions in the occupied territories of the Republic of Azerbaijan and from its own territory.

As a result, one serviceman of the armed forces of the Republic of Azerbaijan was wounded during two months.

The continuous occupation of a large part of the territory of the Republic of Azerbaijan by the armed forces of Armenia remains the main obstacle in the settlement of the conflict and the only source of the escalation of the situation on the frontline and the occurrence of hostilities and casualties.

The sooner the Republic of Armenia withdraws its troops from the occupied territories of the Republic of Azerbaijan, the sooner peace and stability can be restored in the region.

I should be grateful if you would have the present letter and its annexes circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda items 35 and 40, and of the Security Council.

(Signed) Yashar Aliyev
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

^{*} The annexes are being circulated in the language of submission only.



Annex I to the letter dated 12 January 2018 from the Permanent Representative of Azerbaijan to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Violations of the ceasefire by the armed forces of the Republic of Armenia for November 2017*

<i>Dates</i>	<i>Direction (locality)</i>	<i>Weapons used</i>	<i>Number of ceasefire violations</i>	<i>Casualties and damages</i>
1–30 November	Aghdam district, Azerbaijan			
	Afatly village	AK	18	
	Ahmadali village	AK/AKM	21	
	Ahmadaghali village	AK/AKM	60	
	Ayag Garvand village	AKM	17	
	Chamanly village	AK	50	
	Chiragly village	AK	62	
	Evoghlu village	AK	9	
	Mammadbaghirly village	AK/AKM	48	
	Mirashilly village	AK	40	
	Opposite positions	AK/AKM	95	
	Orta Garvand village	AK	45	
	Saryjaly village	AK/AKM	10	
	Yuzbashly village	AK	7	
	Zangishaly village	AK	54	
	Aghjabadi district, Azerbaijan			
	Gyamaddyly village	AK/AKM	123	
	Minakhorlu village	AK/AKM	29	
	Aghstafa district, Azerbaijan			
	Kohna Gyshlag village	AK/AKM	22	
	Beylagan district, Azerbaijan			
	Garadaghly village	AK	28	
	Dashkasan district, Azerbaijan			
	Alkhanchally village	AK/AKM	16	
	Opposite positions	AK	1	
	Tazakand village	AKM	3	
	Zivilyan village	AKM	28	
	Fizuli district, Azerbaijan			
	Ashaghy Abdurrahmanly village	AK/AKM	90	
	Alkhanly village	AK/AKM	53	
	Horadiz village	AK/AKM	91	

Abbreviations: AK, Kalashnikov assault rifle; AKM, modernized Kalashnikov assault rifle; DShK, heavy machine gun; OSV, semi-automatic sniper rifle; PKM, modernized Kalashnikov machine gun; RPG, hand-held anti-tank grenade launcher; 60-mm M, mortar.

* Settlements of the Republic of Azerbaijan included in this information are under occupation by the Republic of Armenia or situated close to the fire point areas.

<i>Dates</i>	<i>Direction (locality)</i>	<i>Weapons used</i>	<i>Number of ceasefire violations</i>	<i>Casualties and damages</i>
	Opposite positions	AK/AKM	545	
	Shukurbayli village	AK/AKM	84	
	Gazakh district, Azerbaijan			
	Alibayramli village	AK	1	
	Ashaghi Askipara village	AKM	1	
	Bala Jafarli village	AK/AKM	36	
	Dashsalahli village	AKM	3	
	Farahli village	AK/AKM	20	
	Jafarli village	AK/AKM	13	
	Gaymagly village	AKM/DShK	30	
	Gushchu Ayrim village	AKM	19	
	Gyzylhajili village	AK/AKM	39	
	Kamarli village	AK/AKM/DShK	44	
	Mazam village	AKM	11	
	Musakoy village	AK/AKM	9	
	Shikhily village	AKM	1	
	Unnamed heights	AKM	2	
	Gedebey district, Azerbaijan			
	Dordlar village	AKM	2	
	Galakand village	AKM	5	
	Garavallar village	AKM	5	
	Gasimaghali village	AKM	22	
	Mutudara village	AKM DShK	33	
	Novoivanovka village	AKM	15	
	Novosaratovka village	AKM	2	
	Unnamed heights	AKM	17	
	Zamanly village	AKM	29	
	Goranboy district, Azerbaijan			
	Borsunlu village	AK/AKM/RPG	93	
	Gargujag village	AKM	28	
	Gulustan village	AKM DShK	74	
	Gyrmyzsaggallar village	AK/AKM	2	
	Kharkhaput village	AK/DShK	24	
	Opposite positions	DShK	29	
	Tapgaragoyunlu village	AK/AKM/DShK	96	
	Unnamed positions	AKM DShK	34	
	Yenikand village	AK	49	
	Yukhari Agjakend village	AKM	2	
	Zeyva village	AK/AKM	36	
	Goygol district, Azerbaijan			
	Kurdalyar village	AKM DShK	24	

<i>Dates</i>	<i>Direction (locality)</i>	<i>Weapons used</i>	<i>Number of ceasefire violations</i>	<i>Casualties and damages</i>
	Opposite positions	AKM	2	
	Pirverdilar village	PKM	19	
	Jabrayil district, Azerbaijan			
	Ahmadalilar village	AK	17	
	Chakhirli village	AK	7	
	Jojug Marjanli village	AK	41	
	Lala Ilahi heights	AK	49	
	Opposite positions	AKM	15	
	Khojavand district, Azerbaijan			
	Opposite positions	AK/AKM	340	
	Unnamed heights	AK/AKM/PKM	2	
	Tartar district, Azerbaijan			
	Chayly village	AK/AKM	68	
	Damirchilar village	AK/AKM	14	
	Gapanly village	AK/AKM	88	
	Gaynag village	AK	3	
	Gazyan village	AK/AKM	20	
	Hasangaya village	AK/AKM	101	
	Husanli	AK	4	
	Jamilly village	AK	13	
	Karmiravan village	AK	36	
	Levonarkh village	AK	2	
	Seyidimli village	AKM	2	
	Opposite positions	AK/AKM/DSHK/60-mm M	156	
	Tazakand village	AK	16	
	Unnamed positions	AK	2	
	Tovuz district, Azerbaijan			
	Aghdam village	AKM/DSHK/OSV	58	
	Aghbulag village	AK/AKM/DSHK	7	
	Alibayli village	AKM	13	
	Garalar village	AK/DSHK	14	
	Hajihasanli village	AKM	1	
	Kokhanaby village	AKM	43	
	Munjuglu village	AK/AKM	40	
	Unnamed heights	AKM	24	

Annex II to the letter dated 12 January 2018 from the Permanent Representative of Azerbaijan to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Violations of the ceasefire by the armed forces of the Republic of Armenia for December 2017*

<i>Dates</i>	<i>Direction (locality)</i>	<i>Weapons used</i>	<i>Number of ceasefire violations</i>	<i>Casualties and damages</i>
1–31 December	Aghdam district, Azerbaijan			
	Afatly village	AK	12	
	Ahmadali	AK	9	
	Ahmadaghali village	AK/AKM	63	
	Ayag Garvand village	AK/AKM	16	
	Chamanly village	AK/AKM	58	
	Chiragly village	AK/AKM	67	
	Evoghlu village	AK	4	
	Mammadbaghirly village	AK	49	
	Mirashilly village	AK/AKM	53	
	Opposite positions	AK/AKM DShK	109	
	Orta Garvand	AK/AKM	56	
	Saryjaly village	AK/AKM	10	
	Unnamed heights	AK	3	
	Yuzbashily village	AK/DShK	10	
	Zangishaly village	AK/AKM	70	
	Aghjabadi district, Azerbaijan			
	Gyamaddynly village	AK/AKM	106	
	Minakhorlu village	AK/AKM	36	
	Beylagan district, Azerbaijan			
	Garadaghly village	AK/AKM	32	
	Dashkasan district, Azerbaijan			
	Alkhanchally village	AKM DShK	13	
	Opposite positions	AK	6	
	Tazakand village	AKM	13	
	Zivilyan village	AKM DShK	17	
	Fizuli district, Azerbaijan			
	Abdurrahmanli village	AK/AKM	7	
	Ashaghy Abdurrahmanly village	AK/AKM	106	
	Alkhanly village	AK/AKM	53	
	Horadiz village	AK/AKM	79	

Abbreviations: AK, Kalashnikov assault rifle; AKM, modernized Kalashnikov assault rifle; DShK, heavy machine gun; PKM, modernized Kalashnikov machine gun; RPG, hand-held anti-tank grenade launcher.

* Settlements of the Republic of Azerbaijan included in this information are under occupation by the Republic of Armenia or situated close to the fire point areas.

<i>Dates</i>	<i>Direction (locality)</i>	<i>Weapons used</i>	<i>Number of ceasefire violations</i>	<i>Casualties and damages</i>
	Opposite positions	AK	552	
	Shukurbayli village	AK/AKM	78	
	Gazakh district, Azerbaijan			
	Alibayramly village	AKM	3	
	Bala Jafarli village	AKM/DSHK	18	
	Farahli village	AK/AKM	30	
	Jafarli village	AKM	4	
	Gaymagly village	AKM/DSHK	43	
	Gushchu Ayrim village	AKM	31	
	Gyzylhajili village	AK/AKM	37	
	Kamarli village	AK/AKM	48	
	Kohna Gyshlag village	AKM	40	
	Mazam village	AKM	6	
	Musakoy village	AK/DSHK	17	
	Shikhly village	AK/AKM	9	
	Unnamed heights	AK	12	
	Gedebey district, Azerbaijan			
	Ayridara village	AKM	1	
	Daryurd village	AKM	4	
	Galakand village	AKM	11	
	Gasimaghali village	AKM	10	
	Mutudara village	AKM	22	
	Novoivanovka village	AKM	13	
	Novosaratovka village	AKM	1	
	Unnamed heights	AKM	11	
	Zamanly village	AKM	37	
	Goranboy district, Azerbaijan			
	Borsunlu village	AK/AKM/RPG	89	
	Gapanli village	AKM	32	
	Gulustan village	AKM/DSHK	77	1 serviceman of the armed forces of Azerbaijan was wounded
	Kharkhaput village	AK	24	
	Opposite positions	AK/AKM	25	
	Tapgaragoyunlu village	AK/AKM/DSHK/RPG	110	
	Unnamed heights	AKM	15	
	Unnamed positions	AKM	30	
	Yenikand village	AK/AKM	77	
	Yukhari Agjakend village	AKM	1	
	Zeyva village	AKM	45	

<i>Dates</i>	<i>Direction (locality)</i>	<i>Weapons used</i>	<i>Number of ceasefire violations</i>	<i>Casualties and damages</i>
Goygol district, Azerbaijan				
	Azgilli village	AKM	1	
	Bash Gishlag village	AKM	1	
	Kurdalyar village	AKM/DSHK	25	
	Opposite positions	AKM	1	
	Pirverdilar village	AK/AKM	14	
Jabrayil district, Azerbaijan				
	Ahmadalilar village	AK	13	
	Jojug Marjanli village	AK	44	
	Lala Ilahi heights	AK/AKM	69	
	Opposite positions	AK	8	
Khojavand district, Azerbaijan				
	Opposite positions	AKM/PKM	342	
	Unnamed heights	AK/AKM	10	
Tartar district, Azerbaijan				
	Chayly village	AK/AKM	102	
	Damirchilar village	AK/AKM	19	
	Gapanly village	AK/AKM	113	
	Gaynag village	AK	2	
	Gazyan village	AK/AKM	18	
	Hasangaya village	AK/AKM	144	
	Husanli	AK	12	
	Huseynly village			
	Jamilly village	AK	16	
	Karmiravan village	AK	7	
	Levonarkh village	AK	5	
	Opposite positions	AK/AKM	164	
	Tazakand village	AK/AKM	11	
	Unnamed positions	AK/AKM	3	
Tovuz district, Azerbaijan				
	Aghdam village	AK/AKM	69	
	Aghbulag village	AK/AKM/DSHK	18	
	Alibayli village	AK/AKM	14	
	Asryk Jirdakhan village	AK	7	
	Garalar village	AKM	15	
	Hajaly village	AKM	4	
	Kokhanaby village	AKM/DSHK	44	
	Munjuglu village	AK/AKM	71	
	Unnamed heights	AKM	8	

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**General Assembly
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Agenda item 44
Question of Cyprus**

**Security Council
Seventy-third year**

**Letter dated 15 January 2018 from the Permanent Representative
of Cyprus to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General**

Upon instruction from my Government, I transmit herewith two documents detailing the infringements of international air traffic regulations and violations of the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by Turkey (see annex I) and the illegal use of closed ports by Turkish warships (see annex II) during the month of November 2017. It should also be noted that Turkish commercial aircraft systematically use the illegal airport of Tymbou.

Furthermore, I wish to inform you that the occupation regime illegally issued seven notices to airmen relating to exercises conducted by the Turkish Air Force in November 2017.

Turkey's actions are clearly aimed at undermining the sovereignty of the Republic of Cyprus, bolstering the continuing de facto division and upgrading the secessionist entity's status by claiming a purported airspace over the occupied territory of the Republic. In addition, Turkey continues to systematically harass civilian and military aircraft within the Nicosia flight information region (FIR) via radio calls. Meanwhile, Nicosia FIR infringements and violations of the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus continue unabated. Turkey's policy of persistently breaching international law and defying international rules and regulations puts the safety of international civil aviation at risk, has a negative impact on the stability of the region and causes difficulties for air traffic over Cyprus.

It should further be underlined that the continuation of Turkey's illegal actions creates tension during a critical period for the successful outcome of the ongoing negotiation process for a peaceful comprehensive solution to the Cyprus problem.

On behalf of my Government, I strongly protest the continuing infringements of international air traffic regulations and the violations of the national airspace and the territorial waters of the Republic of Cyprus by Turkey and appeal for their immediate cessation. The Republic of Cyprus reiterates, in this respect, its call for adherence to the principle of sovereignty and non-interference enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations.



I should be grateful if you would have the present letter and its annexes circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda item 44, and of the Security Council.

(Signed) Kornelios **Korneliou**

Annex I to the letter dated 15 January 2018 from the Permanent Representative of Cyprus to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Air violations

<i>Date</i>	<i>Time</i>	<i>Nature of violation</i>
1 November	0921–0943	One B-200 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia flight information region (FIR) and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia area control centre (ACC)
	0922–1355	One CN-235 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
	1127–1143	One B-200 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
2 November	1305–1503	One S-70 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
3 November	0600–0632	One AB-412 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
	1600–1830	One S-70 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
5 November	2154–2231	One C-130 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
7 November	1343–1347	Two F-16 and two F-4 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
	1437–1513	One C-130 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
8 November	1104–1123	One A-400 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
	1420–1436	One A-400 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC

<i>Date</i>	<i>Time</i>	<i>Nature of violation</i>
9 November	1657-1813	One Turkish military helicopter infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
10 November	0430-0606	One CN-235 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
	1715-2105	One CN-235 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
11 November	1154-1657	One Turkish military helicopter infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
12 November	0941-1313	One CN-235 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
	1025-1050	Two Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
	1050-1139	One CN-235 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
	1815-2004	One CN-235 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
	2212-0202	One CN-235 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
13 November	1024-1040	Two F-4 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
	1052-1113	One C-130 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
	1132-1212	Two F-16 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
	1141-1233	Two F-16 and two F-4 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC

<i>Date</i>	<i>Time</i>	<i>Nature of violation</i>
	1208-1240	Two F-16 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
	1218-1248	One CN-235 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
	1249-1306	One C-130 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
	1324-1339	One C-130 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
	1504-1536	One C-130 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
	1504-1536	One F-16 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
	1530-1546	One C-130 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
14 November	0934-0952	One A-400 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
	0936-1005	One Turkish military helicopter infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
	1054-1136	One F-16 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
	1811-1827	One Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
15 November	0406-0539	One CN-235 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC

<i>Date</i>	<i>Time</i>	<i>Nature of violation</i>
	1034-1202	Five F-16 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
	1115-1140	Two Cougar Turkish military helicopters infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
	1147-1230	One F-16 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
	1541-1607	One F-16 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
	2031-2035	One Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
16 November	1028-1242	One CN-235 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
	1044-1100	One C-130 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
	1122-1142	One C-130 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
	1208-1218	One GLF-4 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
	1340-1355	One C-130 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
17 November	0758-1006	One CN-235 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC

<i>Date</i>	<i>Time</i>	<i>Nature of violation</i>
	1203-1227	Two F-16 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
	1301-1309	One C-130 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
18 November	0710-0753	One AB-412 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
	0720-0953	One S-70 Turkish military helicopter infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
	0825-1017	One Cougar Turkish military helicopter infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
19 November	1134-1248	One CN-235 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
20 November	1704-1853	One CN-235 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
22 November	0948-1116	Two Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
	1017-1100	One AB-412 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
	2050-2113	One GLF-5 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
23 November	0919-1334	One CN-235 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
	1018-1125	One CN-235 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC

<i>Date</i>	<i>Time</i>	<i>Nature of violation</i>
	1405–1545	One UH-1 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
24 November	0900–1313	One CN-235 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
	1402–1456	One CN-235 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
25 November	1305–1515	One CN-235 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
26 November	1231–1427	One Turkish military helicopter infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
	1551–1631	One AB-412 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
27 November	0322–0343	One CN-235 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
	1406–1525	One CN-235 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
	1427–1515	Two F-16 and two F-4 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
	1500–1525	Two F-16 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
29 November	1133–1520	One CN-235 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
30 November	1053–1225	One CN-235 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
	1239–1356	One King Air Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC

Annex II to the letter dated 15 January 2018 from the Permanent Representative of Cyprus to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Naval violations

<i>Dates</i>	<i>Nature of violation</i>
1–4 November	One P-337 Turkish missile vessel violated the territorial waters of the Republic of Cyprus and illegally used the closed port of Famagusta while participating in a naval operation of the occupation forces
2–8 November	One NL-123 Turkish vessel violated the territorial waters of the Republic of Cyprus and illegally used the closed port of Famagusta while participating in a naval operation of the occupation forces
4–6 November	One P-335 Turkish missile vessel violated the territorial waters of the Republic of Cyprus and illegally used the closed port of Famagusta while participating in a naval operation of the occupation forces
6–9 November	One P-335 Turkish missile vessel violated the territorial waters of the Republic of Cyprus and illegally used the closed port of Famagusta while participating in a naval operation of the occupation forces
9 November	One P-335 Turkish missile vessel violated the territorial waters of the Republic of Cyprus and illegally used the closed port of Famagusta while participating in a naval operation of the occupation forces
9–11 November	One P-338 Turkish missile vessel violated the territorial waters of the Republic of Cyprus and illegally used the closed port of Famagusta while participating in a naval operation of the occupation forces
10 November	One P-335 Turkish missile vessel violated the territorial waters of the Republic of Cyprus and illegally used the closed port of Famagusta while participating in a naval operation of the occupation forces
12–14 November	One P-337 Turkish missile vessel violated the territorial waters of the Republic of Cyprus and illegally used the closed port of Famagusta while participating in a naval operation of the occupation forces
14–16 November	One P-335 Turkish missile vessel violated the territorial waters of the Republic of Cyprus and illegally used the closed port of Famagusta while participating in a naval operation of the occupation forces
15–16 November	One F-394 Turkish vessel violated the territorial waters of the Republic of Cyprus and illegally used the closed port of Keryneia while participating in a naval operation of the occupation forces
15–17 November	One S-359 Turkish vessel violated the territorial waters of the Republic of Cyprus and illegally used the closed port of Keryneia while participating in a naval operation of the occupation forces
16–24 November	One P-335 Turkish missile vessel violated the territorial waters of the Republic of Cyprus and illegally used the closed port of Famagusta while participating in a naval operation of the occupation forces

<i>Dates</i>	<i>Nature of violation</i>
24 November	One P-331 Turkish missile vessel violated the territorial waters of the Republic of Cyprus and illegally used the closed port of Famagusta while participating in a naval operation of the occupation forces
27 November	One F-244 Turkish missile vessel violated the territorial waters of the Republic of Cyprus and illegally used the closed port of Famagusta while participating in a naval operation of the occupation forces



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Seventy-second session
Agenda item 142
Joint Inspection Unit

Outcome of the review of the follow-up to the Joint Inspection Unit reports and recommendations by the United Nations system organizations

Note by the Secretary-General

The Secretary-General has the honour to draw the attention of the members of the General Assembly to the report of the Joint Inspection Unit entitled "Outcome of the review of the follow-up to the Joint Inspection Unit reports and recommendations by the United Nations system organizations", which is available under the symbol JIU/REP/2017/5.





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Seventy-second session
Agenda item 142
Joint Inspection Unit

Review of the follow-up to the Joint Inspection Unit recommendations by the United Nations system organizations

Note by the Secretary-General

Addendum

The Secretary-General has the honour to transmit to the members of the General Assembly his comments and those of the United Nations System Chief Executives Board for Coordination on the report of the Joint Inspection Unit entitled "Outcome of the review of the follow-up to the Joint Inspection Unit reports and recommendations by the United Nations system organizations" (JIU/REP/2017/5).



Summary

In its report entitled "Outcome of the review of the follow-up to the Joint Inspection Unit reports and recommendations by the United Nations system organizations" (JIU/REP/2017/5), the Joint Inspection Unit reviewed the acceptance and implementation of its recommendations by the participating organizations.

The present note reflects the views of organizations of the United Nations system on the recommendations provided in the report. The views have been consolidated on the basis of inputs provided by member organizations of the United Nations System Chief Executives Board for Coordination, which welcomed the report and supported some of its conclusions.

I. Introduction

1. In its report entitled "Outcome of the review of the follow-up to the Joint Inspection Unit reports and recommendations by the United Nations system organizations" (JIU/REP/2017/5), the Joint Inspection Unit presented the results of the second phase of the review of the acceptance and implementation of its recommendations. The second phase had been conducted over a two-year period and was intended to draw lessons from the issues affecting the follow-up process and to identify good follow-up practices in order to enhance its functioning system-wide.

II. General comments

2. The organizations of the United Nations system welcome the review of the follow-up to the recommendations of the Joint Inspection Unit and support the general findings contained in the report and the best practices identified therein.

3. While the organizations appreciate the overall report quality of the report, they underscore the important distinction between the role and authority of executive heads and the role and authority of legislative bodies, particularly in reference to the agenda-setting and documentation for those bodies. The organizations note that, in the report, legislative bodies were considered in a one-size-fits-all approach, and that, in some cases, the proposals put forward would increase the time pressure on and the resources needed by boards and/or governing bodies for the consideration of the Joint Inspection Unit items and would entail associated costs or create time pressure for the discussion of other issues.

4. With regard to the audiences to whom the recommendations were addressed and the governance of the follow-up function of the Joint Inspection Unit, the organizations note the need for further clarification by the Unit regarding the process and the criteria that it used in addressing its recommendations to legislative bodies and to executive heads. The organizations also note that recommendations requiring decisions on the part of legislative bodies regarding management issues did not reflect the distinctions between those two types of audiences.

5. The organizations welcome the maturity matrix as a concrete basis for engagement regarding performance on Joint Inspection Unit matters, although organizations whose governing bodies either have decided not to consider the Unit's recommendations or could not include them in the agenda of the meeting, observe that they are penalized by the assessment that recommendations have not been implemented. This leads to a decrease in the actual rates of acceptance and implementation of Unit recommendations by United Nations entities. Furthermore, the organizations observe that recommendations considered not relevant to a given entity should be factored out of the overall rating. In this regard, the organizations suggest that, in future reporting of such statistics, the fact that recommendations are not relevant and/or have not been accepted should be considered and the analysis adjusted.

6. A preference for the placement of the focal point function of the Joint Inspection Unit within the independent oversight body was expressed in the report. One organization considers the responsibilities of the Unit focal point, which require executive action on behalf of the executive head, to be inconsistent with the independence of the oversight office.

7. A number of questions were raised about the process used for addressing recommendations included in management letters, since such letters fall outside the

categories of reports, notes and confidential letters as defined in article 11 of the statute of the Joint Inspection Unit.

III. Comments on specific recommendations

Recommendation 1

The executive heads of organizations who have not yet done so should enhance the consideration of Joint Inspection Unit reports/recommendations by their respective legislative bodies, in line with best/good practices identified, by the end of 2018.

8. Except when statutory provisions do not apply, as in the case of the International Atomic Energy Agency, the organizations partially support recommendation 1, noting that it is not aligned with the respective authorities, roles and responsibilities of the executive heads and legislative bodies. In particular, the organizations underscore that not all reports and recommendations receive the same level of interest on the part of a given legislative body and note that the agendas of the legislative bodies are set by their respective bureaux, not by their executive head or secretariat, including the consideration of Joint Inspection Unit reports.

9. While the organizations agree that efforts should be made to ensure the timely consideration of Joint Inspection Unit reports, in the specific case of the Main Committees of the General Assembly, it is noted that the current practice of bundling them together with relevant reports of the Secretary-General remains the most practical and convenient practice.

10. In the report, it was suggested that the sharing of full copies of Joint Inspection Unit reports¹ with Member States was preferable to the sharing of reports through hyperlinks. The organizations consider that, since the reports are available to the public on the Unit's website, the sharing of hyperlinks is more cost-effective and aligned with paper-smart/paperless and multilingualism requirements. The organizations also note that while Internet connectivity may not yet be universal (which the report identified as the reason that full reports are preferable), Internet is, as a rule, available to the government representatives and officials who participate in the discussions of legislative bodies on Unit matters.

11. In reference to the proposed good practice of preparing summaries of reports of the Joint Inspection Unit and comments of the United Nations System Chief Executives Board for Coordination (CEB) in participating organizations' reporting to legislative bodies as presented in box 1 of the report, the organizations question the added value of that proposal; in particular, they question the efficiency of the preparation by each of the 28 participating organizations of separate summaries, when executive summaries are already publicly available, and therefore consider that providing hyperlinks to the Unit and CEB documents is a best practice.

12. Lastly, it is suggested that the Joint Inspection Unit consider organizing briefings for interested delegations and present selected reports in greater depth, perhaps jointly with a group of organizations at the same duty station (e.g., New York, Geneva, Vienna or Rome).

Recommendation 2

The executive heads of organizations who have not yet done so are requested to propose to their legislative bodies a concrete course of action to be taken with

¹ See JIU/REP/2017/5, paragraph 46 and item 3 of the maturity matrix.

respect to the recommendations of the Joint Inspection Unit addressed to these bodies, especially with regard to system-wide and several organization reports, by the end of 2018.

13. The organizations support recommendation 2 in part or in full, unless statutory restrictions apply, and agree that legislative body engagement on recommendations for their action is fundamental for the effective consideration of Joint Inspection Unit recommendations. The organizations reiterate that, in line with their response to recommendation 1, it is the sole prerogative of the membership of the legislative bodies to formulate and decide on the course of action to be taken and the final text of the decision in question, and that the secretariat of an organization may merely indicate the need for a decision through a neutral text.

Recommendation 3

The General Assembly of the United Nations may wish to request the Secretary-General to make proposals to enhance the decision-making process on Joint Inspection Unit reports and recommendations, in consultation with the Unit, by the end of 2019, including the possibility of reverting to the practices that were applicable prior to the adoption of resolution 59/267.

14. The organizations generally agree with recommendation 3, noting that it is addressed to the General Assembly. Furthermore, the organizations note that participating organizations already report on actions taken in response to Joint Inspection Unit recommendations through the Unit's web-based tracking system, which is accessible to Member States.

Recommendation 4

The legislative bodies of organizations which have not yet done so should request annual follow-up reports on the implementation of prior years' accepted Joint Inspection Unit recommendations until their full implementation, by the end of 2018.

15. While recommendation 4 is addressed to legislative bodies, the organizations note that providing further details over a longer period of time may require a different approach in terms of reporting — and related timing — to the bodies in question (particularly as it refers to the boards of funds and programmes).

Recommendation 5

The executive heads of organizations who have not yet done so should introduce appropriate verification and monitoring procedures on the implementation of prior years' accepted Joint Inspection Unit recommendations until their full implementation, by the end of 2018.

16. The organizations generally support recommendation 5. However, they welcome clarification on the costs/benefits of further verification through an additional independent channel, different from the one used by the Unit. The organizations also note that a better web-based tracking system would improve the monitoring process and related statistics.

17. Furthermore, the organizations observe that existing processes may effectively vet the responses cost-effectively, without the establishment of additional layers of verification processes. For example, if the status of recommendations is reported in detail to a legislative body, the due diligence in place for the clearance of intergovernmental documents should provide a level of assurance that the action taken is accurately reflected.

Recommendation 6

The executive heads of organizations, when considering Joint Inspection Unit recommendations intended to enhance coordination and cooperation, should propose the inclusion of the consideration of these recommendations on the programme of work of CEB and its applicable mechanisms with a timeline for taking a decision, with effect from 2019.

18. The organizations are generally supportive of recommendation 6 and emphasize that the agenda of CEB is decided through a consultative process led by the Secretary-General as its Chair.

Recommendation 7

The executive heads of organizations who have not yet done so should establish a direct reporting line from the Joint Inspection Unit focal point to top management.

19. The organizations support recommendation 7 and consider that management accountability and responsibility for the executive function carried out by the Joint Inspection Unit focal point are essential to its effectiveness.

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Security Council**

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**General Assembly
Seventy-second session
Agenda item 34
Prevention of armed conflict**

**Security Council
Seventy-third year**

**Letter dated 15 January 2018 from the Permanent Representative
of Armenia to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General**

Upon the instructions of my Government, I transmit herewith for your attention the record of the ceasefire violations by the Azerbaijani armed forces along the State border of the Republic of Armenia during the month of December 2017 (see annex I).*

I also transmit herewith for your attention the record of ceasefire violations registered by the Ministry of Defence of the Republic of Artsakh (Nagorno-Karabakh Republic) during the month of December 2017 (see annex II).*

I kindly request that the present letter and its annexes be circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda item 34, and of the Security Council.

(Signed) **Zohrab Mnatsakanyan**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

* The annexes are being circulated in the language of submission only.



Annex I to the letter dated 15 January 2018 from the Permanent Representative of Armenia to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Violations of the ceasefire by the armed forces of the Republic of Azerbaijan along the State border with the Republic of Armenia, 1–31 December 2017

<i>Date</i>	<i>Direction</i>	<i>Incidents</i>	<i>Type of weapons/shots</i>
1 December	Tavush, Ararat, Vayots Dzor, Gegharkunik regions	17	Small arms and light weapons: 294
	Aygedzor	4	Small-calibre sniper weapons: 58
	Chinari	2	Large-calibre sniper weapons: 16 (Daranak: 10; Aygedzor: 6)
	Kolagir	2	Large-calibre machine guns: 80
	Movses	1	
	Aygepar	3	
	Yeraskh	1	
	Paruyr Sevak	2	
	Khndzorut	1	
	Daranak	1	
2 December	Tavush, Gegharkunik regions	7	Small arms and light weapons: 186
	Chinari	1	
	N. Karmiraghbyur	1	
	Movses	2	
	Aygepar	1	
	Vahan	2	
3 December	Tavush region	7	Small arms and light weapons: 70
	Chinari	2	Small-calibre sniper weapons: 20
	Movses	2	
	Aygedzor	1	
	Vazashen	1	
	Kayan	1	
4 December	Tavush region	2	Small arms and light weapons: 20
	Aygepar	1	Large-calibre machine guns: 2
	Vazashen	1	
5 December	Tavush, Gegharkunik regions	4	Small arms and light weapons: 24
	Aygedzor	1	Small-calibre sniper weapons: 12
	Movses	1	Large-calibre machine guns: 2
	Paravakar	1	
	Kakhakn	1	
6 December	Tavush, Gegharkunik regions	6	Small arms and light weapons: 81
	Chinari	1	
	Aygedzor	1	
	Aygehovit	1	
	Kayan	1	
	Vazashen	1	
	Jil	1	
7 December	Tavush region	7	Small arms and light weapons: 67
	Aygedzor	1	Small-calibre sniper weapons: 8
	Paravakar	2	
	Movses	1	
	Vazashen	3	

<i>Date</i>	<i>Direction</i>	<i>Incidents</i>	<i>Type of weapons/shots</i>
8 December	Tavush, Gegharkunik regions	10	Small arms and light weapons: 93
	Chinari	1	Small-calibre sniper weapons: 8
	Aygepar	1	Large-calibre machine guns: 7
	Aygehovit	2	
	Vazashen	3	
	Berkaber	1	
	Kayan	1	
	Chambarak	1	
9 December	Tavush region	2	Large-calibre machine guns: 125
	Kolagir	1	
	Berdavan	1	
10 December	Tavush region	5	Small arms and light weapons: 22
	Aygepar	1	Small-calibre sniper weapons: 1
	N Karmiraghbyur	1	
	Kayan	1	
	Berkaber	1	
	Vazashen	1	
11 December	Tavush region	1	Small-calibre sniper weapons: 1
	Chinari	1	
12 December	Tavush region	2	Small arms and light weapons: 5
	Movses	1	Small-calibre sniper weapons: 2
	Kayan	1	
13 December	Tavush, Gegharkunik regions	5	Small arms and light weapons: 58
	Aygedzor	1	Small-calibre sniper weapons: 2
	Movses	1	Large-calibre sniper weapons: 12 (Aygedzor)
	Aygehovit	1	
	Vazashen	1	
	Chambarak	1	
14 December	Tavush, Gegharkunik regions	8	Small arms and light weapons: 64
	Aygedzor	1	Small-calibre sniper weapons: 1
	Aygepar	1	Large-calibre machine guns: 60
	Vazashen	1	
	Baghanis	1	
	Voskevan	1	
	Jil	1	
	Kakhakn	2	
15 December	Tavush region	15	Small arms and light weapons: 565
	Chinari	4	Small-calibre sniper weapons: 27
	Aygedzor	2	Large-calibre sniper weapons: 23 (Kolagir: 10;
	Kolagir	1	Aygedzor: 8; Paravakar: 5)
	Movses	1	Large-calibre machine guns: 20
	Aygepar	4	
	Kayan	2	
	Berkaber	1	
16 December	Tavush region	3	Small arms and light weapons: 18
	Chinari	1	
	Paravakar	2	

<i>Date</i>	<i>Direction</i>	<i>Incidents</i>	<i>Type of weapons/shots</i>
17 December	Tavus region	9	Small arms and light weapons: 61
	Chinari	1	Small-calibre sniper weapons: 2
	Paravakar	2	
	Aygepar	2	
	Movses	1	
	N. Karmiraghbyur	2	
	Vazashen	1	
18 December	Syunik region	1	Large-calibre machine guns: 70
	Chapni	1	
19 December	Tavush region	1	Small arms and light weapons: 4
	Aygedzor	1	
20 December	Tavush, Syunik regions	3	Small arms and light weapons: 65
	Kolagir	1	Large-calibre sniper weapons: 1 (Baghanis)
	Baghanis	1	
	Chapni	1	
21 December	Tavush region	4	Small arms and light weapons: 48
	Chinari	2	
	Aygedzor	1	
	Aygepar	1	
22 December	Tavush, Ararat regions	9	Small arms and light weapons: 88
	Chinari	3	Small-calibre sniper weapons: 5
	Paravakar	1	Large-calibre machine guns: 30
	Kayan	1	
	Vazashen	1	
	Kirants	1	
	Berkaber	1	
	Paruyr Sevak	1	
23 December	There were no shots.		
24 December	Tavush region	1	Small arms and light weapons: 7
	Kayan	1	
25 December	Tavush region	3	Small arms and light weapons: 27
	Chapni	1	
	Aygedzor	1	
	Koti	1	
26 December	Tavush region	1	Small arms and light weapons: 4
	Vazashen	1	
27 December	Tavush region	2	Small arms and light weapons: 22
	Paravakar	1	
	Vazashen	1	
28 December	Gegharkunik region	2	Small arms and light weapons: 110
	Jil	2	
29 December	Tavush region	2	Small arms and light weapons: 47
	Aygedzor	1	
	Paravakar	1	

<i>Date</i>	<i>Direction</i>	<i>Incidents</i>	<i>Type of weapons/shots</i>
30 December	Tavush, Gegharkunik, Ararat regions	4	Small arms and light weapons: 33
	Chinari	1	
	Vazashen	1	
	Jil	1	
	Yeraskh	1	
31 December	Tavush, Ararat regions	8	
	Aygedzor	2	Small arms and light weapons: 57
	Chinari	1	Small-calibre sniper weapons: 15
	Paravakar	1	Large-calibre machine guns: 10
	Barekamavan	1	
	Baghanis	1	
	Yeraskh	2	

Annex II to the letter dated 15 January 2018 from the Permanent Representative of Armenia to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Violations of the ceasefire by the armed forces of the Republic of Azerbaijan on the line of contact with the Republic of Artsakh (Nagorno-Karabakh Republic), 1–31 December 2017

<i>Date</i>	<i>Direction</i>	<i>Incidents</i>	<i>Type of weapons/shots</i>
1 December	On the line of contact between the armed forces of Artsakh and Azerbaijan	28	Small arms and light weapons: 415 Small-calibre sniper weapons: 9 Small-calibre mortars: 1 (Talış)
2 December	On the line of contact between the armed forces of Artsakh and Azerbaijan	24	Small arms and light weapons: 237 Small-calibre sniper weapons: 12 Large-calibre sniper weapons: 14 (Mehdili)
3 December	On the line of contact between the armed forces of Artsakh and Azerbaijan	17	Small arms and light weapons: 254
4 December	On the line of contact between the armed forces of Artsakh and Azerbaijan	19	Small arms and light weapons: 311 Small-calibre sniper weapons: 4 Grenade launchers: 1
5 December	On the line of contact between the armed forces of Artsakh and Azerbaijan	21	Small arms and light weapons: 554 Small-calibre sniper weapons: 4
6 December	On the line of contact between the armed forces of Artsakh and Azerbaijan	16	Small arms and light weapons: 113 Small-calibre sniper weapons: 5 Large-calibre sniper weapons: 1 (Ashaghi Abdurakhmanli)
7 December	On the line of contact between the armed forces of Artsakh and Azerbaijan	15	Small arms and light weapons: 108 Large-calibre sniper weapons: 4 (Karachuk)
8 December	On the line of contact between the armed forces of Artsakh and Azerbaijan	11	Small arms and light weapons: 65 Small-calibre sniper weapons: 6
9 December	On the line of contact between the armed forces of Artsakh and Azerbaijan	11	Small arms and light weapons: 84 Small-calibre sniper weapons: 14
10 December	On the line of contact between the armed forces of Artsakh and Azerbaijan	22	Small arms and light weapons: 250 Small-calibre sniper weapons: 11 Large-calibre sniper weapons: 2 (Horadiz) Grenade launchers: 1
11 December	On the line of contact between the armed forces of Artsakh and Azerbaijan	14	Small arms and light weapons: 99 Small-calibre sniper weapons: 6
12 December	On the line of contact between the armed forces of Artsakh and Azerbaijan	19	Small arms and light weapons: 181 Large-calibre sniper weapons: 36 (Ashaghi Veysali: 1; Shikhlyar: 35) Large-calibre machine guns: 30 (Yarmja)
13 December	On the line of contact between the armed forces of Artsakh and Azerbaijan	24	Small arms and light weapons: 400 Small-calibre sniper weapons: 56 Large-calibre sniper weapons: 10 (Shikhlyar) Large-calibre machine guns: 5
14 December	On the line of contact between the armed forces of Artsakh and Azerbaijan	28	Small arms and light weapons: 391 Small-calibre sniper weapons: 1 Large-calibre sniper weapons: 11 (Nuzger: 3; Karvend: 7; Karakhanbeyli: 1)

<i>Date</i>	<i>Direction</i>	<i>Incidents</i>	<i>Type of weapons/shots</i>
15 December	On the line of contact between the armed forces of Artsakh and Azerbaijan	20	Small arms and light weapons: 354 Small-calibre sniper weapons: 10 Large-calibre sniper weapons: 7 (Karakhanbeyli: 2; Karvend: 5) Large-calibre machine guns: 8
16 December	On the line of contact between the armed forces of Artsakh and Azerbaijan	22	Small arms and light weapons: 564 Small-calibre sniper weapons: 17
17 December	On the line of contact between the armed forces of Artsakh and Azerbaijan	34	Small arms and light weapons: 413 Small-calibre sniper weapons: 36 Large-calibre machine guns: 1
18 December	On the line of contact between the armed forces of Artsakh and Azerbaijan	31	Small arms and light weapons: 218 Small-calibre sniper weapons: 62 Large-calibre sniper weapons: 8 (Levonarkh)
19 December	On the line of contact between the armed forces of Artsakh and Azerbaijan	19	Small arms and light weapons: 218 Small-calibre sniper weapons: 19 Large-calibre sniper weapons: 2 (Karakhanbeyli)
20 December	On the line of contact between the armed forces of Artsakh and Azerbaijan	20	Small arms and light weapons: 163 Small-calibre sniper weapons: 11 Large-calibre sniper weapons: 8 (Kengerli: 2; Geytap: 2; Talish: 4) Large-calibre machine guns: 20
21 December	On the line of contact between the armed forces of Artsakh and Azerbaijan	32	Small arms and light weapons: 297 Small-calibre sniper weapons: 17
22 December	On the line of contact between the armed forces of Artsakh and Azerbaijan	28	Small arms and light weapons: 201 Small-calibre sniper weapons: 34 Large-calibre sniper weapons: 7 (Gjulistan) Large-calibre machine guns: 7
23 December	On the line of contact between the armed forces of Artsakh and Azerbaijan	14	Small arms and light weapons: 166
24 December	On the line of contact between the armed forces of Artsakh and Azerbaijan	20	Small arms and light weapons: 260 Small-calibre sniper weapons: 7 Large-calibre sniper weapons: 1 (Gjulistan)
25 December	On the line of contact between the armed forces of Artsakh and Azerbaijan	38	Small arms and light weapons: 382 Small-calibre sniper weapons: 3 Large-calibre sniper weapons: 10 (Karachuk: 9; Talish: 1)
26 December	On the line of contact between the armed forces of Artsakh and Azerbaijan	24	Small arms and light weapons: 172 Small-calibre sniper weapons: 9 Large-calibre sniper weapons: 5 (Bash Karvend: 3; Jraberd: 2) Large-calibre machine guns: 50
27 December	On the line of contact between the armed forces of Artsakh and Azerbaijan	32	Small arms and light weapons: 377 Small-calibre sniper weapons: 44 Large-calibre sniper weapons: 23 (Ashaghi Abdurakhmanli: 3; Karachuk: 2; Shikhlyar: 14; Gjulistan: 4) Small-calibre mortars: 1 (Levonarkh)
28 December	On the line of contact between the armed forces of Artsakh and Azerbaijan	17	Small arms and light weapons: 195 Small-calibre sniper weapons: 1 Large-calibre sniper weapons: 22 (Shikhlyar)

<i>Date</i>	<i>Direction</i>	<i>Incidents</i>	<i>Type of weapons/shots</i>
29 December	On the line of contact between the armed forces of Artsakh and Azerbaijan	39	Small arms and light weapons: 350 Small-calibre sniper weapons: 1 Large-calibre sniper weapons: 3 (Namerli: 1; Karachuk: 2)
30 December	On the line of contact between the armed forces of Artsakh and Azerbaijan	30	Small arms and light weapons: 230 Small-calibre sniper weapons: 6 Large-calibre sniper weapons: 17 (Shikhlyar: 4; Gijulistan: 13) Large-calibre machine guns: 40
31 December	On the line of contact between the armed forces of Artsakh and Azerbaijan	31	Small arms and light weapons: 388 Small-calibre sniper weapons: 18

During the reporting period, two soldiers of the Defence Army of Artsakh were wounded by fire from the Azerbaijani side.



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Security Council**

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General Assembly
Seventy-second session
Agenda item 37
The situation in the Middle East

Security Council
Seventy-third year

**Identical letters dated 20 December 2017 from the Chargé
d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of Lebanon to the
United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the
President of the Security Council**

On instructions from my Government, I transmit to you herewith the recommendation concerning the recent decision of the Government of the United States of America on Jerusalem that was adopted by the Lebanese Parliament at its session of 8 December 2017 (see annex).

I should be grateful if you would have the present letter and its annex circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda item 37, and of the Security Council.

(Signed) Hassan Abbas
Chargé d'affaires a.i.



**Annex to the identical letters dated 20 December 2017 from the
Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of Lebanon to the
United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the
President of the Security Council**

**Recommendation of the Lebanese Parliament concerning the recent decision of
the Government of the United States of America on Jerusalem**

The Lebanese Parliament, which convened on 8 December 2017 to discuss the American decision concerning Quds al-Sharif, believes that the decision to move the American embassy and recognize Jerusalem as the capital of Israel will lead to war, threatens regional and international peace and security, and provides a cover for Israel's occupation, acts of aggression, settlement-building and all its transgressions of international and humanitarian law. This decision also gives impetus to the hostile plans to Israelize and Judaize Palestine, and such a development would, in turn, portend implementation of the plan to resettle and disperse the Palestinian people and dispense with the question of Palestine, and serve as a prelude to the realignment of the political geography of the Arab region.

The Lebanese Parliament deplores and condemns this decision and reaffirms that the starting point for building and crafting just and comprehensive peace in the Middle East is to underscore the Palestinian people's national right and aspiration to return, and their rights to exercise self-determination, establish an independent Palestinian State with Jerusalem as its capital and implement Security Council resolutions concerning Arab territories.

The Parliament reaffirms that:

1. It supports the right of the Palestinian people to engage in its just resistance and struggle to free itself from Israeli occupation and realize its right to return and establish an independent State, with Jerusalem as its capital.
2. It strongly rejects the decision of the American Administration to close the office of the Palestine Liberation Organization in Washington.
3. It condemns the decision of the Israeli occupiers to continue their colonialist settlement-building activities in the occupied territory of the Palestinian State.
4. The Palestinian parliamentarians who were abducted and detained in the Israeli occupiers' prisons or are being held in administrative detention must be freed. To that end, parliaments and regional and international parliamentary groups, led by the Inter-Parliamentary Union, must take punitive and deterrent measures.
5. It supports Palestinian national reconciliation under the auspices of the Palestine Liberation Organization and calls for all efforts to be directed towards completing the march to independence, culminating in the return of the refugees to their homes and the establishment of a fully sovereign, independent State.
6. All Arab and regional efforts must be directed at employing all capabilities to help Palestinians exercise their rights and to avoid all other conflicts.
7. This recommendation should be transmitted, in the name of the Lebanese people and Government, to the American Administration, the members of the Security Council and the United Nations General Assembly, and it should be considered an official document in the name of the Lebanese people.

(Signed) Nabih Berri
Speaker of the Parliament

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**General Assembly
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Peacebuilding and sustaining peace****Security Council
Seventy-third year****Peacebuilding and sustaining peace****Report of the Secretary-General****I. Introduction**

1. Two years ago, the General Assembly and the Security Council came together to express their commitment to building and sustaining peace. They emphasized, in the twin resolutions on the review of the peacebuilding architecture, General Assembly resolution 70/262 and Security Council resolution 2282 (2016), that Member States needed to work better together to sustain peace at all stages of conflict and in all its dimensions and stressed that sustaining peace was imperative to preventing the outbreak, escalation, continuation and recurrence of conflict. It was recognized in the resolutions that sustaining peace should be broadly understood as a goal and a process to build a common vision of a society, ensuring that the needs of all segments of the population were taken into account.

2. In the resolutions, the General Assembly and the Security Council recognized that sustaining peace was a shared task and responsibility of Government and all other national stakeholders and should flow through all three pillars of the United Nations' engagement at all stages of conflict. They further reaffirmed the primary responsibility of national Governments and authorities in identifying, driving and directing priorities, strategies and activities for sustaining peace and emphasized that inclusivity was key to advancing national peacebuilding processes and objectives.

3. An important breakthrough in the twin resolutions was the recognition that efforts to sustain peace were necessary not only once conflict had broken out but also long beforehand, through the prevention of conflict and addressing its root causes. More countries have recently experienced violent conflict than at any time in nearly three decades. Forced displacement has reached unparalleled levels. In too many places, the cohesion of societies and the well-being of people are at risk. Building a common vision of society must involve paying attention to the causes of those problems. In the resolutions, it was recognized that the international community must redouble its efforts to support Member States in preventing crises that exact such unacceptable and growing human and financial tolls. Another important element of the resolutions was the recognition of the importance of women's leadership and



participation in conflict prevention, resolution and peacebuilding and the need to increase the representation of women at all decision-making levels in national, regional and international institutions and mechanisms for the prevention and resolution of conflict. The consideration of gender-related issues in all discussions pertinent to sustaining peace should remain at the front of the efforts of the United Nations and the international community.

4. The present report is submitted pursuant to paragraph 30 of the resolutions on the review of the peacebuilding architecture. It provides an update on the progress made in the implementation of the resolutions and contains specific recommendations to address existing gaps. My aim is to forge a common vision and common systems and capacities across the United Nations to consistently and adequately support Member States in their endeavour to sustain peace and build resilient and prosperous nations in line with their commitments to leave no one behind.

5. The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development contains the blueprint of the common vision of society towards which the world is trying to move. Inclusive and sustainable development not only is an end in itself but also happens to be the best defence against the risks of violent conflict. The 2030 Agenda also contains the promise to leave no one behind in the quest to build such societies. In the twin resolutions, it was recognized that development was a central goal in itself, and the important contributions of the United Nations development system to peacebuilding, in particular through economic development and poverty eradication, were acknowledged. The United Nations system needs to continue to strengthen cooperation and coordination for that purpose in the field through United Nations country teams and at United Nations Headquarters, in accordance with their respective mandates, with respect for national ownership and the priorities of countries affected by conflict, including through the overarching framework of the United Nations operational activities for development.

6. The scale and nature of the challenge of sustaining peace calls for closer strategic and operational partnerships among the United Nations, national Governments and other key stakeholders, including international, regional and subregional organizations, international financial institutions, civil society organizations, women's groups, youth organizations and the private sector, taking into account national priorities and policies. In today's complex world, those partnerships need to harness the energies of all sectors of society. The United Nations is one partner among others, and all partners need to come together in support of the efforts of Governments.

7. I am convinced that the fragmentation of efforts across the United Nations system undermines its ability to support Member States in their efforts to build and sustain peaceful societies and to respond early and effectively to conflicts and crises. I have therefore introduced a set of mutually reinforcing reforms to ensure that the United Nations is more fit for purpose, including in the realms of development, management and peace and security. The reforms aim to ensure greater coherence and accountability within those pillars and generate greater coherence and synergies across the United Nations system.

II. Operational and policy coherence to strengthen support to peacebuilding and sustaining peace

8. In the resolutions, there was a call in strong terms for more coherence in international support to Member States in their efforts to build and sustain peace. Decades of experience and a number of independent studies, including the report of the Advisory Group of Experts on the Review of the Peacebuilding Architecture (see

A/69/968-S/2015/490), have pointed to scattershot, incoherent and occasionally contradictory or competitive international efforts as a significant source of failed peacebuilding efforts. Given the resurgence of conflict and the vast scale of crisis and suffering around the globe, greater operational and policy coherence among international actors and across the United Nations system is critical to strengthening support to Member States.

9. The most crucial sources of support are usually other Member States, often those in the same region or with strong historical ties, that can provide the political and financial support necessary to the process of building a peaceful society. The essential idea behind the creation of the peacebuilding architecture in 2005 was to institutionalize the process and establish a standing mechanism to rally Member States around specific peacebuilding challenges. The Peacebuilding Commission, which has a unique role to play in advancing intergovernmental coherence through its cross-pillar mandate, has already diversified its working methods to enhance its flexibility as a dedicated intergovernmental platform. Recent good practices of the Commission include attention to cross-border and regional issues in the Great Lakes region and the Sahel, support to the transition from a peace operation in Liberia and the adoption of a gender strategy that is the first of its kind for an intergovernmental body of the United Nations. Member States have also used the platform of the Commission for constructive discussions on Burkina Faso, Colombia, Kyrgyzstan, Papua New Guinea, Solomon Islands, Somalia and Sri Lanka, at the initiative of the countries concerned. I welcome such flexibility and innovation and encourage further efforts to enhance the role of the Commission.

10. Regional and other more flexible frameworks for coherent intergovernmental support to sustaining peace have also shown great promise, in particular when they involve the necessary resolve and a common vision among the countries concerned. The engagement of the countries of the Sahel region, including through the framework of the Group of Five for the Sahel, to address the complex and multidimensional challenges facing them is a good example of Member States' leadership in that regard. It also highlights the need for a system-wide approach from the United Nations and for close collaboration with partners such as the African Union, the European Union, the World Bank, the Alliance for the Sahel, Member States and the countries concerned to ensure a coordinated, coherent, integrated and results-oriented response.

11. I welcome other efforts by Member States to enhance policy coherence in support of sustaining peace. In January 2017, the President of the General Assembly convened a high-level dialogue on sustainable development and sustaining peace, in which I participated and which brought together the President of the General Assembly, the President of the Security Council, the President of the Economic and Social Council and the Chair of the Peacebuilding Commission for the first time to promote coordination and coherence across peace and development efforts. The Human Rights Council also considered the links between peacebuilding and human rights at its thirty-fourth session. Such initiatives have built upon the regular exchanges held by the Peacebuilding Commission with the Economic and Social Council and the Security Council.

12. Coherence and complementarity among the principal organs of the United Nations, including the governing bodies of United Nations entities, are critical. The role of the Economic and Social Council in the oversight of operational activities for development, development cooperation and humanitarian assistance and its overall coordination of the United Nations development system complement the valuable work of the Security Council and the Peacebuilding Commission. I welcome the strong resolve shown by Member States in that regard and encourage them to explore

further opportunities to enhance links at the intergovernmental level in support of sustaining peace in the field.

13. When the United Nations works together across the three pillars and with all relevant partners, a meaningful difference can be made in peoples' lives. Coherence in operational engagement is key in that respect. In the Gambia, the value could be seen of swift and sustained regional engagement in support of national conflict prevention efforts through the Economic Community of West African States, supported by the Security Council and the Peacebuilding Commission and backed up by a coordinated and coherent United Nations system. Immediately after the peaceful resolution of the post-electoral crisis in the Gambia, a United Nations assessment mission, a visit by the Chair of the Peacebuilding Commission and the quick disbursement of grants and provision of capacities from the Peacebuilding Fund, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the Department of Political Affairs and the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights were critical in ensuring support to the new Government's work to sustain peace. The identification of peacebuilding priorities and the design of United Nations country-level support have been nationally driven and focused on ensuring ownership and sustainability.

14. Similarly, in Liberia, work is under way to ensure that United Nations support is sustained and coherent in a transition context. The Peacebuilding Commission has provided advice to the Security Council on the transition of the peace operation mandate and the development of a national peacebuilding plan, led by national stakeholders and supported by the recovery and peacebuilding assessment, a tripartite framework of the United Nations, the World Bank and the European Union. In follow-up, the Peacebuilding Commission provided a platform for United Nations leadership in Liberia to discuss with Member States a capacity mapping exercise to identify expected financing and expertise gaps following the departure of the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL). A multi-partner trust fund has been established and is supported by the Peacebuilding Fund in its catalytic role.

15. The opportunities for meaningful impact on the ground when the United Nations system joins up its efforts are especially evident where peace operations are deployed. Peace operations, both special political and peacekeeping missions, can be powerful platforms for preventing conflict from escalating and for sustaining peace, as acknowledged and welcomed in the resolutions. Together with development, humanitarian and human rights actors, United Nations peace operations carry out regular strategic assessments to develop a shared understanding and to propose options for the best way to support Member States in sustaining peace. In order to maximize the coherence and, therefore, the impact of that support, such assessments should have stronger links to integrate³ strategic frameworks and the United Nations Development Assistance Framework, which would enable mission components and members of United Nations country teams to work from the same analysis and towards the same goals, in support of national priorities. A good example is the United Nations Peacebuilding and Development Assistance Framework in the Central African Republic, which supports the national recovery and peacebuilding plan for the period 2017–2021, aligns national priorities across peace and security, reconciliation, human rights and development and is supported by the Peacebuilding Fund and the Peacebuilding Commission. I reaffirm my commitment to integration as a way of maximizing the impact of the United Nations in mission settings. I have also requested that the integrated assessment and planning policy be revised to improve coherent action across the United Nations system in support of sustaining peace.

16. There are also useful examples of in-country cross-pillar cooperation in specific substantive areas. In 10 conflict-affected countries, the Global Focal Point for Police, Justice and Corrections Areas in the Rule of Law in Post-Conflict and Other Crisis

Situations of UNDP and the Department of Peacekeeping Operations brings together different parts of the United Nations engaged in support to the rule of law for joint analysis, planning and programming. In Somalia, the United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia and the United Nations country team implement a joint programme to support rule of law institutions of Somalia, bringing together nine United Nations partners around common strategic objectives. The model has also been useful in ensuring that cross-cutting issues are the priority of all United Nations entities. For example, through programmes supported by the Global Focal Point, there has been an increased focus on women's access to justice in core rule of law programmes, as well as greater implementation of the 15 per cent target for spending on advancing gender equality and the empowerment of women as a principal objective.

17. Working jointly requires a coherent division of expertise and the pooling of resources. The Joint Programme on Building National Capacities for Conflict Prevention of UNDP and the Department of Political Affairs supports the deployment of peace and development advisers in more than 40 resident coordinator offices. Peace and development advisers provide in-country analytical and programmatic guidance, support the conflict sensitivity of United Nations Development Assistance Frameworks and United Nations country team programmes and strengthen national capacities for prevention. In Lesotho, for example, the peace and development adviser facilitated United Nations support to the country's national reform processes, including dialogue and consensus-building. The joint project of UNDP, the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, the Department of Field Support and the Department of Political Affairs on United Nations transitions in mission settings is another example of cross-pillar cooperation. The challenge now is to turn such examples into standard practice, so that Member States can benefit from joined-up United Nations support that has maximum impact. To that end, I will build upon such initiatives by encouraging the creation of additional cross-system models for United Nations joint technical support that pool capacities and funding, resulting in programming that helps to sustain peace.

18. My proposed restructuring of the peace and security pillar, as supported by the General Assembly in its resolution 72/199, will also contribute to greater coherence of United Nations efforts (see A/72/525). It is aimed at prioritizing conflict prevention and sustaining peace, enhancing the effectiveness and coherence of peacekeeping operations and special political missions, overcoming fragmentation by moving towards a single integrated peace and security pillar and aligning the peace and security pillar more closely with the development and human rights pillars so as to foster greater coherence and cross-pillar coordination. To that end, existing substantive capacities and resources in the area of peace and security will be reorganized and integrated more rationally, including through the creation of a single political-operational structure with regional responsibilities that will support a more holistic approach to peacebuilding and sustaining peace through the development of regional strategies and approaches, enhanced partnerships with regional organizations and more effective support to the Peacebuilding Commission.

19. As mandated by the resolutions on the review of the peacebuilding architecture, the Peacebuilding Support Office will be reinforced to assume a stronger cross-pillar bridging role to strengthen the pillar's orientation towards sustaining peace. Building upon its existing work in support of the development-humanitarian-peacebuilding continuum, the Office will function as a "hinge" between the peace and security pillar and the other pillars and with the humanitarian community. It will be responsible for connecting relevant tools and approaches across the conflict spectrum, drawing together the expertise of the United Nations system to facilitate coherent system-wide action, and for strengthening partnerships within and beyond the United Nations.

Together with the participation of the Assistant Secretary-General for Peacebuilding Support in key cross-pillar mechanisms, including the Executive Committee, the significant strengthening of the Peacebuilding Fund and enhanced support to the Peacebuilding Commission, those measures will contribute to the revitalization of the Office and help to fulfil the original vision behind its establishment, to foster strategic coherence in United Nations efforts in support of sustaining peace.

20. In order to realize that vision, I propose that the capacity of the Peacebuilding Support Office be strengthened within the existing resources of the peace and security pillar. In that respect, I ask Member States to consider favourably my detailed proposals for the restructuring of the peace and security pillar and to enhance the capacities of the Peacebuilding Support Office and other parts of the proposed Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs for conflict prevention and peacebuilding, including through the use of the peacekeeping support account for peacebuilding activities in relevant peacekeeping settings. I also encourage United Nations entities to continue to second personnel to the Office both to reinforce its capacity and to strengthen system-wide synergy and coherence.

21. The international human rights framework, in particular Member States' obligations under the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, provides a critical foundation for sustaining peace. The collective work of the United Nations system to advance human rights should help to identify the root causes of and responses to conflict. In that respect, it will remain imperative for the peace and security and development pillars to make better use of the existing human rights mechanisms, such as special procedures, the treaty bodies and the universal periodic review, and their recommendations in support of Member States.

22. Central to those efforts is a more coherent United Nations that will think, plan and programme in a joined-up way, drawing upon its full range of tools to support Member States. This begins with a common understanding of the major risks and opportunities relevant to each Member State. A common analysis of those risks and opportunities in turn allows for risk-informed development strategies and targeted efforts to build resilience and sustain peace. No region or State will face the same mix of risks or the same level of exposure to those risks. The Sustainable Development Goals provide a blueprint for engaging with Member States on those issues. At the country level, there should be a common prioritization of risks and opportunities, grounded in universally agreed human rights and humanitarian norms and standards, as well as robust gender analysis. Peacebuilding strategies linked to programmes with corresponding joint steering committees, including Governments, the United Nations and civil society, have been helpful. I will ask senior United Nations leadership in the field to ensure joined-up analysis of risks and to translate such analysis into coherent strategies and actions in support of sustaining peace.

23. In the resolutions, the important contributions of the United Nations development system to peacebuilding were recognized and the need to continue strengthening cooperation and coordination for that purpose, respecting both national ownership and the priorities of countries affected by conflict, was stressed. Sustainable development is the primary goal and an end in itself. It also has the advantage of being the best guarantee of peace that endures. The primary objective of the United Nations development system is to support Member States in achieving the 2030 Agenda and the Sustainable Development Goals, based on national ownership of the goals.

24. My proposed reforms of the development system foresee a new generation of United Nations country teams, centred around a strategic United Nations Development Assistance Framework and led by an impartial, independent and empowered resident coordinator, with a stronger focus on providing collective

support and generating common results. As outlined in my report on repositioning the United Nations development system to deliver on the 2030 Agenda (A/72/684-E/2018/7), the development system needs to be much more cohesive and integrated at the country level to expand the offer of whole-of-system expertise to countries. Resident coordinator offices, drawing upon the full range of expertise of resident and non-resident United Nations entities, should be equipped to serve as hubs for collective analysis and planning. Resident coordinator offices would therefore be responsible for coordinating development strategies that are risk informed and help to build peaceful and inclusive societies. Critical to this will be a revitalized United Nations Development Assistance Framework, as the single most important United Nations country planning instrument, informed by a conflict and development analysis endorsed by the United Nations Sustainable Development Group. The analysis will be continuously updated to incorporate guidance on conflict sensitivity and sustaining peace and should be used routinely in planning processes of the Frameworks, with the support of peace and development advisers, where present. Already, 80 per cent of the Frameworks launched in 2017 include contributions to sustaining peace. I will strive to ensure that the Frameworks are risk informed and become more effective tools for supporting national efforts to build resilience and for accelerating transitions out of crisis to sustain peace.

25. United Nations entities are adapting to this cross-pillar approach to sustaining peace within their respective mandates. Already, 77 per cent of resident coordinators report close collaboration among entities engaged in development, disaster risk reduction, humanitarian action and sustaining peace. Of the 19 entities, 16 include peacebuilding and sustaining peace in their strategic plans, guidance and training. The United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), for example, has included targets relating to the promotion of peaceful and inclusive societies in its Strategic Plan, 2018–2021. Supporting peacebuilding initiatives is a core priority of the strategic plan for the period 2017–2022 of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. The World Food Programme has adopted a peacebuilding policy and guidance. Recognizing the primacy of existing mandates, the needs articulated by Member States and the overriding importance of development as the primary objective, I encourage all United Nations entities to view sustaining peace as an important goal to which their work can contribute and to integrate the approach to sustaining peace into their global and country-specific strategic plans, as appropriate.

26. The United Nations Sustainable Development Group is a key mechanism for United Nations coherence and, under the leadership of the Deputy Secretary-General, is on track to become even more effective. Working closely with the recently established joint steering committee to advance humanitarian and development collaboration, the Group will also place greater emphasis on fostering synergies in humanitarian and development action, as well as its links to peace, in support of the 2030 Agenda. In addition, United Nations support to countries for the implementation of the Sustainable Development Goals must be guided by the mainstreaming, acceleration and policy support strategy developed by the Group and must be risk informed and conflict sensitive. I will deploy multidisciplinary missions of the mainstreaming, acceleration and policy support strategy to help to ensure that support to national planning for the 2030 Agenda is conflict sensitive and integrated. I will also ensure that the new United Nations Sustainable Development Group, under the leadership of the Deputy Secretary-General, will continue to promote cross-pillar coordination and coherence in support of the 2030 Agenda and its links to peace, including through its results groups.

27. Without the full participation of women in society, neither peace nor prosperity can be ensured over the long term. The meaningful participation of women measurably strengthens protection efforts and deepens the effectiveness of

peacebuilding. Research also points to the direct relationship between gender equality, on the one hand, and resilience to and prevention of conflict, on the other. The women and peace and security agenda is therefore essential for all the work of the United Nations system in support of Member States. My Seven-Point Action Plan on Gender-Responsive Peacebuilding to accelerate progress on the participation of women in peacebuilding aims to increase financing for gender-responsive peacebuilding, expand the access of women to decision-making and improve gender-sensitive analysis and planning. I remain committed to ensuring the full implementation of the Seven-Point Action Plan and will request a review and update of all elements of the Plan in the light of the reforms that I have initiated, well in advance of the forthcoming twentieth anniversary of the adoption of Security Council resolution 1325 (2000), to ensure that the appropriate changes are made and that the United Nations system can demonstrate effectively the progress made in that area.

28. Young people represent the future of society and are also very much the present. While young people's experience of peace and conflict is varied, conflict can disrupt educational and employment opportunities, leading to trauma and mistrust towards the State and the international community. Most young people resist violence, and some actively engage in peacebuilding and sustaining peace despite the risks they face. Yet, young people remain underrepresented in decision-making at all levels. It is high time that the contribution of young people to sustaining peace was recognized and supported. The youth and peace and security agenda offers opportunities to galvanize coherent United Nations engagement in support of young people and their contribution to peacebuilding and sustaining peace. I look forward to the recommendations of the independent progress study on youth and peace and security requested by the Security Council in its resolution 2250 (2015) and to further advancing the agenda together with Member States.

III. Leadership, accountability and capacity in supporting peacebuilding and sustaining peace

29. I am determined to improve leadership, accountability and capacity across the United Nations system, both at Headquarters and in the field, so that the Organization can offer Member States the most effective possible support in sustaining peace. This will need to include efforts to ensure the continuity of relevant peacebuilding programmes, senior leadership and personnel through different phases of United Nations engagement, in order to improve transitions, and a strengthening of the capacity of the senior leadership of the United Nations country team to absorb relevant peacebuilding functions following the drawdown of Security Council-mandated missions.

30. The adoption in 2017 of a system-wide leadership framework underscores my commitment to improving leadership across the United Nations system. My system-wide strategy on gender parity is aimed at addressing the lack of parity at all levels, in particular in senior positions, and at improving organizational culture with respect to gender.

31. A major objective of the management reform proposals Member States have now endorsed is to decentralize decision-making, bringing it closer to the point of delivery and making the planning and budget process more accountable and responsive. I intend to empower heads of departments, offices, regional commissions and field missions to align authority in the management of financial, human and material resources with the delegated responsibility for mandate implementation. A clearer link between resources and results will serve to achieve greater transparency and accountability. The ability to manage resources effectively in response to urgent

requirements, emerging risks and current operational needs will enhance the Organization's effective and timely support in sustaining peace.

32. At the heart of my proposals for the repositioning of the United Nations development system is my conviction that a new generation of United Nations country teams is required for delivery on the 2030 Agenda, supported by empowered, impartial and competent resident coordinators. The proposals are also based upon the results of an independent review, conducted by the Overseas Development Institute, of the capacities of United Nations system agencies, funds and programmes to sustain peace. In its review, the Institute concluded that there was a need to strengthen capacities to conduct conflict or context analysis and to translate analysis into more conflict-sensitive programming. As integrators of policy concerning all of the Sustainable Development Goals, resident coordinators must be better prepared to work across the development-humanitarian-peacebuilding continuum. This includes a strong understanding of relevant United Nations normative frameworks and the ability to translate these into system-wide analysis, planning and programming. In conflict-affected settings, resident coordinators will need to ensure that United Nations country teams work in an integrated manner with United Nations peace operations to contribute fully to building resilience and sustaining peace. In relevant contexts, resident coordinators, including triple-hatted deputy special representatives of the Secretary-General, must receive integrated support from development, humanitarian, and peacebuilding entities in order to foster an integrated response that includes human rights and gender equality, and must be accountable for improving inter-agency collaboration to support national actors in risk management, resilience-building and the promotion of peaceful and inclusive societies.

33. It is important that those in leadership positions in the field receive assistance from Headquarters, including guidance, training, surge capacities, peer-to-peer support and the delegated authority to take calculated risks in support of national priorities. Resident coordinators must have a diverse skillset, with strong leadership, team-building and communications skills, including in integrated planning, risk management, gender issues and human rights, in order to be able to promote coherence in a collaborative manner. It is also important for resident coordinators to have gained experience from working in United Nations system organizations and to be involved in continuing their professional education. I will encourage diversity of experience across peace and security, development, human rights and humanitarian issues for all United Nations senior leadership, with improved and adequately incentivized inter-agency mobility, including across all three pillars of the United Nations.

34. The need for collaborative leadership is particularly in evidence when a United Nations peace operation is being drawn down. I recommend that, during the drawdown, a mapping of capacity of the United Nations country team against peacebuilding priorities be undertaken and discussed with Member States through the Peacebuilding Commission. This is what occurred in Liberia, where the assessment of capacities against the priorities outlined in the Liberia peacebuilding plan, conducted by the joint project of UNDP, the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, the Department of Field Support and the Department of Political Affairs on United Nations transitions in mission settings, showed the need for substantial investments through the United Nations country team in order to continue peacebuilding efforts. Comprehensive gender analysis and effective planning are also essential to ensure that gains on gender equality are not eroded when peace operations are withdrawn. Another example of good practices in this regard is the integrated transition planning that took place in Côte d'Ivoire. Integrated planning at an early stage and throughout the life cycle of a mission is critical. Additional planning capacity should also be deployed where and when required.

35. Not all types of technical expertise are available within United Nations country teams or missions. Resident coordinators must be able to benefit from the expertise and assets of the entire United Nations system to ensure better delivery of their mandates. I will take steps to ensure that resident coordinators can draw more easily on advice from centres of expertise at Headquarters and at the regional level. In my report on repositioning the United Nations development system, I indicated that as part of the optimization of regional structures, the Organization would ensure that the development and review of United Nations Development Assistance Frameworks included a more thorough analysis of regional and transboundary issues, with the regional commissions as an integral part of the process. The regional commissions could also play a supporting role in integrated analysis at the regional level and provide a convening platform for intergovernmental dialogue. Over the medium term, United Nations regional assets should be restructured so as to streamline and maximize the impact of the United Nations regional presence in support of attaining the Sustainable Development Goals and, as part of that objective, sustaining peace.

36. In the report on the United Nations development system, I also included proposals to strengthen resident coordinator offices and ensure that capacities matched the needs of national priorities, building on the comparative advantages of the United Nations system. The United Nations system's efforts must continue to be oriented around three key principles: reinforcing national ownership; developing country-contextual responses; and ensuring the effective delivery of development results on the ground. In considering the specificity of each context, I recommend that staff of the resident coordinator offices or of the integrated presence in a country have advisory responsibilities, in addition to planning and coordination, monitoring and evaluation and financing support functions, in accordance with the United Nations Development Assistance Framework. I recommend that the Joint Programme on Building National Capacities for Conflict Prevention, which currently deploys more than 40 peace and development advisers to resident coordinator offices, in full agreement with the respective Governments, serve as a model for making such enhanced capacities available.

37. Under my proposal for restructuring the peace and security pillar, the single regional structure will offer guidance and support to resident coordinators in non-mission settings, in close cooperation with the United Nations Sustainable Development Group. The proposed Departments of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs and of Peace Operations will continue to house staff specialized in electoral affairs, mediation support, military affairs, police, rule of law, civil affairs, security sector reform, mine action and disarmament, demobilization and reintegration. The proposed Departments of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs and of Peace Operations will also continue to support gender mainstreaming through their gender capacities, working closely with the United Nations Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women (UN-Women). Examples of flexible mechanisms that allow for the relevant expertise to be available at the appropriate time are the Standby Team of Senior Mediation Advisers, the newly established High-level Advisory Board on Mediation, the United Nations single electoral roster, multidisciplinary teams deployed through the Global Focal Point for Police, Justice and Corrections Areas in the Rule of Law in Post-Conflict and Other Crisis Situations, the UNDP ExpRes Roster for Crisis Response, UN-Women regional advisers on women and peace and security and capacities deployed under the joint project of UNDP, the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, the Department of Field Support and the Department of Political Affairs on United Nations transitions in mission settings. The three regional special political missions in Central Africa, West Africa and Central Asia and the regional presence of agencies, funds and programmes of the United Nations system are also important sources of advice and support in this regard. I will build upon these existing good practices in the provision of appropriate expertise and surge capacities

to resident coordinators, United Nations country teams and peace operations to support national needs, including by encouraging all entities to work in effective cross-pillar partnerships.

IV. Financing for peacebuilding


38. In the twin resolutions, Member States recognized the need for United Nations peacebuilding efforts, including those of United Nations country teams and the peacebuilding components of peacekeeping operations and special political missions, to have adequate, predictable and sustained financing in the face of challenges that included fragmentation across the system, competition for resources, lack of risk tolerance and speed, weak links between analysis and implementation, and insufficient dedicated resources to address conflict risks, including in transition settings.

39. Financing United Nations peacebuilding activities should be seen against the backdrop of total financial resources available for countries affected by violent conflict. Nearly half of all people living in extreme poverty reside in countries affected by conflict and fragility. Unless concerted action is taken by 2030, that figure is expected to rise to 80 per cent by 2035. The trend is discouraging: official development assistance (ODA) to conflict-affected countries¹ fell as a share of global ODA from 40 per cent (equivalent to \$44.6 billion²) in 2005 to 28 per cent (equivalent to \$41.4 billion) in 2015. The focus on peacebuilding in conflict-affected countries has declined, from 18.0 per cent of ODA in 2009 to 13.0 per cent in 2015 (see figure 1). By contrast, net financial outflows from conflict-affected countries were estimated at \$53 billion in 2016. Annually, less than 2 per cent of ODA to conflict-affected settings was allocated to advancing gender equality or meeting women's rights and needs. The international community needs to make financing for development work for fragile and conflict-affected countries. I therefore encourage Member States to support Governments in planning and financing their national implementation plans with regard to the Sustainable Development Goals. On the United Nations side, as I have stressed in my report on repositioning the United Nations development system, the United Nations will take steps to scale up its capacities to support Member States in their efforts in financing the Goals.

¹ Countries with country-specific special political missions or a multidimensional peacekeeping operation, or that are eligible for or are recipients of Peacebuilding Fund funding as of September 2017.

² Constant prices of 2015.

Figure 1
Official development assistance for conflict-affected countries, 2005–2015



Source: Peacebuilding Support Office, based on the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) Creditor Reporting System, OECD Stat.

40. As I have noted repeatedly since assuming office, the costs of responding to crises have become unsustainably high: the international community spent \$233 billion over the past 10 years on humanitarian responses, peacekeeping and in-donor refugee costs. According to the United Nations-World Bank joint study, entitled *Pathways for Peace: Inclusive Approaches to Preventing Violent Conflict*, it is estimated that effective prevention would save anywhere from \$5 billion to \$70 billion per year for the affected country and the international community combined. Investing in prevention pays off. It saves lives, money and development gains. But the United Nations does not have sufficient resources to support Member States in preventing violent conflict. For example, 2015 and 2016 annual allocations for a total of 15 Headquarters-based United Nations trust funds and global programmes related to peace amounted to approximately \$200 million, according to available reports on them, far less than what is needed.

41. In contexts in which peacekeeping operations are present, notable progress has been made in the allocation of resources from peacekeeping mission assessed budgets for mandated programmatic activities in support of peacebuilding. This support now totals approximately \$250 million annually, of which approximately \$180 million is directed towards mine action and the rest towards activities such as community violence reduction and promotion of the rule of law. These activities are implemented directly by peacekeeping missions and other partners on the basis of their comparative advantages. I welcome existing budgetary allocation for programmatic activities in peacekeeping budgets as valuable support to peacebuilding.

42. Despite such progress, there remains a significant gap in resources and capacities to fulfil the peacebuilding components of mission mandates and meet broader national peacebuilding needs. In 2016, according to a recovery and peacebuilding assessment in the Central African Republic, the costs for peacebuilding and recovery between 2017 and 2021 were estimated at \$3.2 billion, with \$2.2 billion pledged by donors in November 2016. In Liberia, in the context of the drawdown of UNMIL, the financial estimate for the work of the United Nations country team in

support of the national peacebuilding plan over two years is \$130 million, with \$10 million pledged by the Peacebuilding Fund by December 2017.

43. An emerging good practice is the establishment of pooled funds at the country level in support of the United Nations Development Assistance Framework, linked to a national peacebuilding plan, accompanied by the Peacebuilding Commission and supported by the Peacebuilding Fund in its catalytic role. Pooled funds have a strong track record in strengthening coherence and coordination; broadening the contributor base; improving risk management and leverage; empowering the resident coordinator and providing incentives for collaboration, including across United Nations pillars, thus encouraging integrated programming. They are particularly useful ahead of a mission drawdown. Pooled funds should be supported by a country-level, nationally owned mapping of peacebuilding resource needs and total financial resources available, including national resources. I encourage United Nations senior leadership to map peacebuilding resource needs, on the basis of a joined-up risk analysis, and to establish a country-specific pooled fund in support of the Framework. Fragmented financial streams can also be linked to planning and programming through country platforms. For example, the Somalia Development and Reconstruction Facility, supported by the World Bank and the United Nations, binds the international community together in mutual accountability with Somali counterparts through a joint governance and secretariat structure overseeing separate funds.

44. While financial support for peacebuilding activities is indispensable, the contribution of in-kind resources can also be significant. The United Nations Office for South-South Cooperation has implemented integrated peace and development approaches in Burundi, Chad, Haiti, Sierra Leone, Somalia and Timor-Leste with support from UNDP and United Nations Volunteers and partners such as the Islamic Chamber of Commerce, Industry and Commodity Exchange. I encourage United Nations senior leadership to support South-South and triangular cooperation in peacebuilding.

45. At the Headquarters level, it is essential to ensure that adequate, predictable and sustained financing is available to support peacebuilding at the country level. Non-core resources are important but also increase transaction costs, fragmentation, competition and overlap. Yet, these earmarked contributions have grown six times faster than core contributions to United Nations development system entities in the past 15 years, reducing core resources to only 15 per cent of the total. In response to this challenge, I have proposed a funding compact to Member States to explore options that could help to improve the quality and predictability of resources allocated to the United Nations, in return for greater effectiveness, transparency and accountability for system-wide results.

46. In order to help to address issues of fragmentation and competition among funding instruments and to enhance transparency, accountability and effectiveness, I will also establish a funding dashboard for peacebuilding. The dashboard will serve to catalogue existing instruments, including their capitalization, rules and procedures, governance structures and areas of intervention. The dashboard will allow the Executive Committee, relevant inter-agency coordination mechanisms and senior leadership, including in the field, to track global peacebuilding resources, and will promote greater strategic alignment of funding. It will also allow for more accurate tracking of the Organization's own commitments, including to ensure that 15 per cent of funding in this area is earmarked for gender equality and women's empowerment as a principal objective. I will continue to encourage greater coordination among these funding instruments, including through joint assessments and common initiatives.

47. The Peacebuilding Fund, as a timely, catalytic and risk tolerant instrument, is a critical vehicle as the United Nations steps up its efforts to build resilience and drive,

at a greater scale, integrated United Nations action for prevention. The Fund has supported national partners and United Nations country teams in responding strategically to peacebuilding needs, aiding transitions from mission to non-mission settings and facilitating alignment with international financial institutions and other partners. The role of the Fund as a financial catalyst for peacebuilding must therefore be enhanced further. At the country level, the Fund's investments should be leveraged to maximize investments from other stakeholders. In the Democratic Republic of the Congo, an initial \$12 million Fund contribution for stabilization was more than doubled by additional contributions from donors. In Sri Lanka, an initial \$12 million Fund investment mobilized five other donors to support the \$82 million peacebuilding priority plan. Financial forecasting for the Fund, based on country-driven needs across several windows — including support for transitions, private sector engagement, cross-border and regional initiatives, and a gender and youth initiative — places the estimated total requirements for the Fund at \$500 million annually. I therefore reiterate my call for a “quantum leap” in contributions to the Fund, which should be unearmarked and provided for a longer term to ensure that support is both responsive and predictable.

48. Ensuring a dedicated minimum of 15 per cent of all United Nations-managed funding in support of peacebuilding projects to advance gender equality and women's empowerment as a principal objective is part of my Seven-Point Action Plan on Gender-Responsive Peacebuilding. This has been furthered through dedicated instruments, such as the Women's Peace and Humanitarian Fund, as well as through earmarking within country-level trust funds such as the Myanmar Joint Peace Fund and the Stabilization Coherence Fund for the Democratic Republic of the Congo, which have adopted the 15 per cent target. The Peacebuilding Fund reached 19.2 per cent in 2016 and raised the target to 30 per cent in its business plan for the period 2017–2019. I request that all United Nations funding mechanisms in support of peacebuilding projects meet and exceed this 15 per cent target and that Member States contribute specifically in this area, where resources are scarce but the impact great.

49. In the resolutions, I was requested to provide options on increasing, restructuring and better prioritizing funding dedicated to United Nations peacebuilding activities, including through assessed and voluntary contributions, for the consideration of Member States. The options are set out below:

(a) **Voluntary resources.** A number of Headquarters-level trust funds in the Secretariat are inactive and unutilized. To support the financing of the Peacebuilding Fund, I call upon donors to agree to allocate the remaining balance of any Headquarters-level trust fund inactive for two years or more to the Fund;

(b) **Assessed contributions.** These would provide higher predictability and sustainability of funding for peacebuilding, and reduce the costs of voluntary resource mobilization. It is important to note that the use of assessed contributions would send a powerful signal regarding the commitment of all Member States to peacebuilding and sustaining peace;

(c) **Assessed contributions during mission drawdowns.** Mission transitions and drawdowns represent some of the most critical periods and the time during which investments in sustaining peace made by national authorities and their international partners over the years can be either sustained or lost in a matter of months. After a drawdown, United Nations country teams commonly face a “financial cliff” in support for peacebuilding activities. In the case of Liberia, the financial estimate in support of the peacebuilding plan is \$65 million per year for two years, or approximately 55 per cent per year of the final full-year budget of UNMIL in the amount of \$116.95 million. In recognition of the imperative of well-managed and appropriately resourced transitions, I call upon the principal contributors to peacekeeping budgets to voluntarily commit the equivalent of 15 per cent of the final

full-year budget of a closing peacekeeping mission, to be contributed to peacebuilding activities through existing projects or the country-level pooled fund managed by the resident coordinator office, each year for a period of two years following the end of the mission's mandate;

(d) **Unspent assessed contributions.** Peacekeeping missions are sometimes left with unencumbered balances at the end of the financial period. At the end of the 2015/16 period, the balance amounted to \$279 million, which was credited to Member States as unspent funds. I call upon Member States to voluntarily commit unspent peacekeeping budget funds to the Peacebuilding Fund;

(e) **Assessed contributions for the Peacebuilding Fund.** In its report, the Advisory Group of Experts on the Review of the United Nations Peacebuilding Architecture recommended that the General Assembly consider steps to ensure that core funding representing \$100 million or an approximate and symbolic 1 per cent of the value (whichever is higher) of the total United Nations budgets for peace operations (peacekeeping and special political missions together) be provided to the Fund annually from assessed contributions under the United Nations budget. The assessed contributions should be provided in a way that ensures necessary oversight without undermining the Fund's comparative advantage as a fast, unearmarked, flexible and pre-positioned pooled fund working under terms of reference approved by the General Assembly. I call upon Member States to consider the allocation of assessed contributions to the value of \$100 million or a symbolic 1 per cent of the total annual cost of peace operations to the Fund;

(f) **Re-investing savings from assessed budgets.** When the overall financial requirements for peacekeeping operations decrease, some of the variance should be reinvested in peacebuilding. In years when the total approved resources for peacekeeping operations are less than those of the previous year, I call upon Member States to agree to be assessed the equivalent of 15 per cent of the total variance in the approved resources to finance the Peacebuilding Fund;

(g) **Diversifying available resources.** I am exploring the possibility of innovative financing solutions for peacebuilding, including contributions by individuals, foundations and faith-based organizations, bonds, levy and tax-based revenue generation, corporate partnership and blended finance. There are already several promising examples, which include social impact bonds to pay for rehabilitation centres in Mali, corporate partnerships for sustaining peace in Nigeria and South Sudan, and crowdfunded peacebuilding initiatives.

50. The United Nations mobilizes more than \$250 million annually from corporate partners and is engaging with the private sector on setting investment guidelines and on a wide range of other issues through the United Nations Global Compact. I welcome recent initiatives to strengthen partnerships for peacebuilding. In 2017, the fourth Business for Peace annual conference was held in Colombia. Colombia will become a test case for blended finance, using grant money to unleash commercial financing for peacebuilding. In Liberia, companies supported the project design and financially contributed to an initiative to mitigate concession-related conflicts. I encourage the United Nations system to further develop partnerships with the private sector and the investment community to strengthen the peacebuilding impact of companies, set conflict-sensitive investment guidelines and explore potential contributions to United Nations peacebuilding activities. This should be undertaken in accordance with the Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights: Implementing the United Nations "Protect, Respect and Remedy" Framework.

51. To support this ongoing work, the Peacebuilding Fund, working closely with the United Nations Sustainable Development Group, will assume a strategic resource mobilization role for predictable and sustained financing for peacebuilding. This

would include exploring opportunities for contributions from the private sector through traditional means, as well as considering partnerships and innovative financing methods. This capacity will work in coordination with the proposed United Nations development system innovative funding lab. The Fund will explore the possibility of establishing a web-based donation mechanism, the use of crowdfunding websites and establishing partnerships with companies to mobilize voluntary levies on products or services.

52. I also encourage Member States to explore innovative means of financing peacebuilding activities, including through the issuance of social impact bonds in peacebuilding, the voluntary implementation of a tax on the trade in (specific) arms, or the donation of fines imposed on defence industry corporations to United Nations peacebuilding activities.

V. Partnerships for peacebuilding and sustaining peace

53. An ecosystem of partners working in support of Governments is critical for sustaining peace, as recognized by Member States in the resolutions. Regional and subregional organizations play a key role in the peaceful settlement of disputes, including through preventive diplomacy, confidence-building and mediation efforts, preventing violent extremism, peacekeeping and peacebuilding. They also share knowledge, analytical capacity and strong local networks. African initiatives in peacebuilding, for example, include the African Union policy on post-conflict reconstruction and development and the African Solidarity Initiative. A Joint United Nations-African Union Framework for Enhanced Partnership in Peace and Security was signed in 2017, and a subsequent memorandum of understanding adopted between the African Union Commission and the Peacebuilding Support Office.

54. Through the Peacebuilding Commission, Member States have enhanced collaboration with regional and subregional organizations, including on the Sahel, Central Africa and the Great Lakes region, as well as in the Gambia. I encourage the Commission to continue to regularly convene meetings on country-specific and regional issues with regional and subregional organizations.

55. The United Nations engages regularly in joint analysis, planning and information-sharing with regional organizations, as well as direct collaboration. It has also increased the number of liaison offices to regional and subregional partners, including the African Union, European Union, Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, Association of Southeast Asian Nations and Southern African Development Community. The proposed new peace and security pillar will continue to prioritize such strategic partnerships and ensure that regional special political missions in Central Africa, West Africa, and Central Asia continue to hold regular thematic intergovernmental dialogues with regional and subregional organizations and strengthen joint analysis, planning and activities in support of sustaining peace. I encourage system-wide engagement with regional and subregional organizations on peacebuilding and sustaining peace, with a focus on regular dialogue, enhanced information-sharing, improved coordination, and joint approaches and activities, on the basis of comparative advantages.

56. Sustaining peace requires much closer collaboration between the United Nations and international financial institutions. I am committed to continuing to develop the Organization's partnership with the World Bank and other international financial institutions. The United Nations has already made great strides in partnership with the World Bank, building on the complementarity between the Organization's implementation capacity, security operations, deep-field presence and normative frameworks, and the World Bank's significant financial resources and technical

expertise. This comes at a time when the World Bank is investing heavily in conflict-affected countries, as the International Development Association window doubled its allocation to countries affected by violent conflict to \$14.4 billion for the period 2017-2020.

57. In April 2017, the President of the World Bank and I signed the United Nations-World Bank Partnership Framework for Crisis-Affected Situations, according to which the two institutions are jointly committed to identifying and reducing critical multidimensional risks of crisis and to preventing violent conflict. Building upon this framework, I will work with the President of the World Bank to ensure the operationalization and implementation of the partnership framework for crisis-affected countries, including through consideration of appropriate follow-up to the United Nations-World Bank study, *Pathways for Peace*. The partnership framework remains open for the participation of other international financial institutions.

58. Pilot projects at the country level suggest that an institutionalized partnership between the United Nations and the World Bank can unlock significant financial flows towards peacebuilding and sustaining peace. In Yemen, with support from the United Nations-World Bank partnership trust fund, a World Bank staff member was deployed to the Office of my Special Envoy for Yemen to support continued World Bank engagement. An International Development Association allocation of \$819 million was made for Yemeni institutions, community support and national capacities, implemented by UNDP, UNICEF and the World Health Organization. In the Central African Republic, Somalia and Yemen, methodologies are being piloted for joint analysis and planning across humanitarian, peace, and development actors including the World Bank. Such collaboration will also be needed in contexts such as the Sahel, to promote resilience and sustainable development, and strengthen local capacity to implement financing from the World Bank, African Development Bank and Islamic Development Bank.

59. Community-level engagement by the United Nations is another critical component of sustaining peace. Developing participatory approaches that involve civil society and local communities is instrumental in peacebuilding as well as in preventing violent extremism and addressing the conditions conducive to terrorism. This is already taking place in different forms in many contexts but should be continuous and systematic. The Department of Peacekeeping Operations is developing a community-engagement framework, currently piloted in the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic. In Malawi, the United Nations has supported conflict prevention at the local level through a pool of trained youth and a women's peacebuilding network, which has been mediating conflicts over land, family conflicts and gender-based violence issues in their communities. I recommend that all United Nations peace operations and United Nations country teams develop community-engagement strategies in consultation with national and local stakeholders, particularly youth and women's groups, and that these be shared, monitored and reviewed with local actors.

60. I welcome the Peacebuilding Commission's inclusion of civil society, with an emphasis on field-based civil society organizations, in its consultations as part of its enhanced working methods. The inclusion of such organizations is now a shared practice in country-configuration meetings and during country visits of Peacebuilding Commission members. In this way, the Commission is also fulfilling its role as a bridge to help the analysis and experiences of civil society reach the Security Council.

61. United Nations engagement with civil society organizations at the country level takes many forms: building capacity, sharing good practices, producing practical tools, fostering a conducive environment for robust civil society, and active engagement in analysis, planning, programming and monitoring and evaluation. The

United Nations has developed guidelines on civil society engagement in mission settings. In consultation with civil society, guidelines on system-wide engagement with civil society for sustaining peace will be developed.

62. Since 2016, under its gender and youth promotion initiatives, the Peacebuilding Fund has supported United Nations entities and civil society organizations as direct recipients of funding, with projects totalling \$40 million. In addition, all projects allocate approximately 40 per cent of funding to local civil society organizations as implementing partners. The Peacebuilding Fund is also partnering with such organizations on programme design, including in Madagascar and the Niger, and community-based monitoring and evaluation in the Niger, Papua New Guinea and Sri Lanka. I encourage initiatives that allow civil society organizations to be direct recipients of funding for peacebuilding activities and that specify percentages of funding to be allocated to work undertaken by local civil society organizations.

63. United Nations funding windows for civil society organizations should include a focus on youth-led organizations. I encourage the international community to tap into the peacebuilding potential of youth organizations, including by improving their access to funding, technical support and capacity-building and by providing space for youth participation in programming. It is also imperative to ensure an enabling environment for youth organizations and internal expertise to engage with youth. I ask that the proposed Departments of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs and of Peace Operations and relevant agencies, funds and programmes ensure capacity to support youth engagement on peacebuilding activities. The study on youth, peace and security progress mandated by the Security Council in its resolution 2250 (2015) will provide more specific recommendations for youth inclusion.

64. Women's organizations and networks also have important contributions to make in enabling women's leadership and participation in conflict prevention and ensuring the sustainability of women's grass-roots peacebuilding. Women's participation improves prevention efforts and overall security, especially on issues such as the prevention of violent extremism. Women's peace huts in Liberia, for example, supported by local women's organizations and UN-Women, and funded by the Peacebuilding Fund, are playing an effective role in mediating small-scale conflicts before they result in violence and in holding State security services accountable. In Burundi, Jordan, Colombia and Solomon Islands, the Women's Peace and Humanitarian Fund is providing crucial resources to women's organizations to support effective community-level mediation efforts, prevention and resilience, and peace agreement implementation. As the only fund that specifically supports the work of women's organizations in prevention and response, it has already demonstrated the exponential impact per dollar in prevention through supporting women's capacities.

VI. Conclusion

65. The proposals I have made to Member States on the reform of the peace and security pillar, the repositioning of the development system and the shifting of the management paradigm have their own logic, rationale and legislative trajectories. If endorsed, they will contribute in no small measure to an Organization that is more effective in supporting Member States in preventing conflict and sustaining peace. In the present report, I have outlined the considerable progress already achieved and built on the proposed reforms to set out additional, targeted changes to ensure that the United Nations does not lose sight of the linkages between its work in peace, development, human rights and humanitarian action. Some of these changes are proposed and pending Member State approval; others, I am undertaking under my own authority.

66. Sustaining peace is first and foremost a responsibility of Member States. The mirror image of a United Nations system that is better oriented towards prevention, human rights and sustainable development is a Membership that sees these as mutually reinforcing, sovereignty-affirming and within national interests. This is a lesson the United Nations has learned time and again. Political will to sustain peace remains invaluable.



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Agenda item 72 (c)

**Promotion and protection of human rights: human rights
situations and reports of special rapporteurs
and representatives**

**Security Council
Seventy-third year**

**Letter dated 16 January 2018 from the Permanent Representative of
Ukraine to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General**

I have the honour to transmit herewith the statement of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine of 16 January 2018 regarding the illegal transfer of Ukrainian citizens from the temporarily occupied territory of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea to the Russian Federation (see annex).

I would appreciate your kind assistance in having the present letter and its annex circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda item 72 (c), and of the Security Council.

(Signed) Volodymyr Yelchenko
Ambassador
Permanent Representative



Annex to the letter dated 16 January 2018 from the Permanent Representative of Ukraine to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Statement of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine on the illegal transfer of Ukrainian citizens from the temporarily occupied territory of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea to the Russian Federation

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine expresses its strong protest against the illegal transfer to the Russian Federation of the citizens of Ukraine Muslim Aliev, Emir-Usein Kuku, Vadym Siruk, Enver Bekirov, Refat Alimov and Arsen Dzhapparov detained on the territory of the temporarily occupied Autonomous Republic of Crimea under trumped-up charges in terrorist activities.

In accordance with the norms of international humanitarian law the occupying power is forbidden from forceful transfer of citizens of the occupied state to the territory of the occupying power. The commission by the state-occupant of such unlawful actions entails its international legal responsibility.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine demands from the Russian side to stop the practice of illegal transfer of Ukrainian citizens from the temporarily occupied territory of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol to the Russian Federation and immediately return them to the territory of Ukraine.



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**Promotion and protection of human rights:
human rights situations and reports of special
rapporteurs and representatives**

Security Council
Seventy-third year

**Letter dated 16 January 2018 from the Permanent Representative of
Ukraine to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General**

I have the honour to transmit herewith the statement of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine of 16 January 2018 regarding the decision of the Russian occupation authorities in Crimea in the case of Volodymyr Balukh (see annex).

I would appreciate your kind assistance in having the present letter and its annex circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda item 72 (c), and of the Security Council.

(Signed) Volodymyr Yelchenko
Ambassador
Permanent Representative



Annex to the letter dated 16 January 2018 from the Permanent Representative of Ukraine to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Statement of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine regarding the decision of the Russian occupation authorities in Crimea in the case of Volodymyr Balukh

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine expresses its resolute protest over the illegal and politically motivated decision of the so-called "court" of the Russian occupation authorities in Crimea in the case of citizen of Ukraine Volodymyr Balukh.

Sentencing Volodymyr Balukh to three years and seven months in a penal colony under absurd and fabricated charges the Kremlin has again testified to its unwillingness to give up the policy of targeted repressions and intimidations against the Ukrainian citizens in the temporarily occupied Crimean peninsula.

We urge the aggressor and occupant state to halt violations of human rights and fundamental freedoms of the residents of the temporarily occupied Ukrainian territory and to immediately release Volodymyr Balukh and other illegally detained citizens of Ukraine.

Russia must stop the illegal occupation of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol and implement to their full the resolutions of the UN General Assembly "Territorial integrity of Ukraine" of 27 March 2014, "Situation of human rights in the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol (Ukraine)" of 19 December 2016 and of 19 December 2017 as well as the order of the International Court of Justice regarding provisional measures in the case of Ukraine vs Russia regarding the application of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination.

We call on our international partners to intensify political and diplomatic pressure on the Kremlin in order to make the occupant state to stop criminal oppression and persecutions of Ukrainian citizens in the occupied Crimea and to withdraw from the sovereign territories of Ukraine.





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Promotion and protection of human rights: human rights situations and reports of special rapporteurs and representatives

Letter dated 29 December 2017 from the Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to transmit herewith the text of a statement of the Presidium of the State Council of the Republic of Crimea to the General Assembly in connection with the adoption by the General Assembly of resolution 72/190 on the situation of human rights in Crimea (see annex).

I should be grateful if you would have the present letter and its annex circulated as a document of the General Assembly under agenda item 72 (c).

(Signed) V. Nebenzia



Annex to the letter dated 29 December 2017 from the Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Statement to the General Assembly in connection with the adoption of the resolution on the situation of human rights in Crimea

In this statement, we will address the adoption by the General Assembly on 19 December 2017 of resolution 72/190 on the situation of human rights in Crimea, the draft of which was put forward by Ukraine.

We believe the adopted document to be inconsistent with the fundamental principles and provisions of the United Nations enshrined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which is the primary international instrument related to the promotion and protection of human rights and freedoms, and also with other international human rights instruments. It is deplorable that the Crimean people must witness this process, not least because it was in Crimea that the decision to establish the United Nations was taken.

The Ukrainian action also disregards the right of peoples to self-determination, which is enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations, international covenants on human rights and the 1970 Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations. This right was exercised by the multi-ethnic Crimean people in the historic referendum of 16 March 2014.

We consider that the events of spring 2014 clearly demonstrated that the Crimean people were prepared to stand up for the fundamental right of each person and citizen: the right to life. The alternative would have been civil war and bloodshed, which would have continued until the present, particularly because the leadership of the Ukrainian State still includes individuals who are concealing their pro-fascist and inhumane views behind the mask of democracy.

Article 1 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights states: "All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights. They are endowed with reason and conscience and should act towards one another in a spirit of brotherhood." But can we really say that the actions by Ukraine towards the Crimean people reflect this? We consider the water, food, transportation and energy blockade to be a form of terror against all inhabitants of the Crimean Peninsula.

It is also worth remembering that "concern" about the observance of human rights in the Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol is being expressed by a State that has unleashed a bloody and fratricidal civil war in south-eastern Ukraine and has collectively labelled the people of the Donbas region — its own citizens, as Kiev asserts — terrorists and separatists. Moreover, baseless accusations of human rights violations are being made against Russia and the multi-ethnic Crimean people by a country which has incorporated into its ideology aggressive nationalism, glorification of Nazism and neo-Nazism, the violation of the rights of ethnic minorities, the persecution of religious denominations which it finds objectionable, the repression of dissenting voices and a crackdown on the freedom of the media.

Such accusations are particularly out of place and cynical from a State which, throughout the entire period in which Crimea was part of Ukraine, made absolutely no effort to improve the human rights situation in our Peninsula. None of the many recommendations made by international human rights bodies to Kiev between 1991 and 2013 have been implemented.

Lastly, how can there be talk of "concern" for the Crimean people given that representatives of Ukraine repeatedly emphasized in their statements in one of the General Assembly committees in October and November that there is no such thing as a "Crimean people"? Should we really be surprised that, faced with this kind of attitude, over 90 per cent of this "non-existent" multi-ethnic Crimean people voted for the historic reunification with Russia?

Representatives of States Members of the United Nations,

Distinguished colleagues,

We repeat our proposal that a visit to Crimea should be arranged in order to provide an objective assessment of the human rights situation in our Republic. We are particularly looking forward to the visit of parliamentarians from countries that supported the General Assembly resolution initiated by Ukraine.

Presidium of the State Council of the Republic of Crimea
Simferopol, 25 December 2017

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Agenda item 24 (b)

Operational activities for development:

South-South cooperation for development

**Preparatory process of the second High-level United Nations
Conference on South-South Cooperation**

Note by the Secretary-General

Summary

The present note is prepared in response to paragraph 3 of resolution 71/318, in which the General Assembly requested the Secretary-General to prepare a background note, including proposals for the overarching theme of the second High-level United Nations Conference on South-South Cooperation, to be held in Buenos Aires from 20 to 22 March 2019, taking into account the important role of South-South and triangular cooperation and the implementation of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, and sub-themes for the interactive panel discussions, for the consideration of Member States.



I. Introduction

1. The present note is prepared in response to paragraph 3 of resolution 71/318, in which the General Assembly requested the Secretary-General to prepare a background note, including proposals for the overarching theme of the second High-level United Nations Conference on South-South Cooperation, to be held in Buenos Aires from 20 to 22 March 2019, taking into account the important role of South-South and triangular cooperation and the implementation of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, and sub-themes for the interactive panel discussions, for the consideration of Member States.

2. The High-level Conference, which will mark the fortieth anniversary of the adoption of the Buenos Aires Plan of Action for Promoting and Implementing Technical Cooperation among Developing Countries, will be aimed at reviewing the trends in South-South cooperation and triangular cooperation, including the progress made by the international community, in particular the United Nations, in supporting and promoting such cooperation and identifying new opportunities, as well as challenges and suggestions to overcome them.

3. The present note serves to highlight the fact that South-South cooperation has become an important element of the global cooperation architecture for sustainable development. It underscores the potential of South-South cooperation and triangular cooperation to further contribute to the achievement of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. The note also contains a proposal for an overarching theme and four sub-themes for the Conference.

4. The landscape of international development cooperation is evolving in the light of the growth of South-South cooperation for sustainable development, driven by the essential role of such cooperation in bolstering the productive capacities of developing countries and its positive impacts on trade and financial flows, technological capabilities and economic growth (see General Assembly resolution 71/244). In that context, the second High-level United Nations Conference on South-South Cooperation will build on the Buenos Aires Plan of Action and the Nairobi outcome document of the High-level United Nations Conference on South-South Cooperation to enable the international community to consolidate its approach to the role of South-South cooperation in the implementation of the 2030 Agenda and other internationally agreed development goals. The Conference will therefore provide the opportunity to review lessons learned over the past four decades, with a view to implementing an inclusive strategy that effectively leverages South-South and triangular approaches to achieving sustainable development for all, leaving no one behind.

5. The implementation in countries of the South of a set of successful public policies on economic, social, scientific and technological matters, and the determination to promote partnerships and reduce asymmetries by facilitating mutual learning and the exchange of knowledge and experience, have highlighted the relevant contribution that South-South cooperation can make to addressing persistent development challenges. In that context, mention may be made of the many instruments and institutions that have been put in place by these countries to harness the potential of South-South cooperation for sustainable development (South-South interregional processes of cooperation, regional and thematic sustainable development policy dialogues, the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, the New Development Bank, the Belt and Road Initiative and trust funds dedicated to South-South cooperation, among others).

6. Despite the notable progress achieved by some countries of the South, they still face significant economic, social and environmental challenges. The exchange of

knowledge, experiences and development solutions is critical for the countries of the South to achieve the 2030 Agenda, including the Addis Ababa Action Agenda of the Third International Conference on Financing for Development, and other internationally agreed development goals and frameworks. However, a gap still exists in the mapping, documentation and sharing of experiences and best practices in South-South and triangular cooperation. There is a need to mobilize and use in a systematic way the broad South-South knowledge on sustainable development for the benefit of all.

7. The Conference is aimed at reviewing trends in South-South cooperation and triangular cooperation, addressing challenges and opportunities, and discussing the contribution of South-South and triangular cooperation to the achievement of the 2030 Agenda.

II. South-South cooperation and the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development

8. The 2030 Agenda is the major global sustainable development framework that guides international efforts towards the achievement of sustainable development in a coherent and inclusive manner. Given its scope and ambition, the implementation of the 2030 Agenda requires the mobilization of all types of partnerships that should be engaged coherently towards common objectives. Countries are encouraged to step up their efforts to strengthen South-South cooperation and triangular cooperation in the context of an enhanced and revitalized global partnership for sustainable development.

9. Profound changes have taken place in the international cooperation context in recent decades, and South-South cooperation has been recognized as an important element of international cooperation for sustainable development involving all stakeholders. There is, however, a gap in effectively following up on South-South cooperation and its impact on achieving sustainable development objectives.

10. Countries of the South are important players in the global economy. In recent years, they have generated about half of the world's gross domestic product (GDP) and have contributed the most to recent global economic growth.

11. Through solidarity, countries of the South are contributing to the implementation of the Sustainable Development Goals in other developing countries through the provision of resources and by sharing their own experiences and approaches to development.

12. South-South cooperation must be understood as an important framework that complements traditional North-South cooperation, not as a substitute for North-South cooperation. Despite the remarkable gains and benefits of South-South cooperation, a renewed global partnership and a strengthened United Nations development system must play a crucial role in achieving the Sustainable Development Goals.

13. In the 2030 Agenda, through Goal 17 (Revitalize the global partnership for sustainable development), Member States called for an inclusive and revitalized partnership for sustainable development based on a spirit of strengthened global solidarity, focused in particular on the needs of the poorest and most vulnerable and with the participation of all countries and all stakeholders. As underscored by the Nairobi outcome document, South-South cooperation embraces a multi-stakeholder approach that brings together Governments, the United Nations system, the private sector, civil society, academia and other actors, mobilizing all available resources in line with national development strategies and plans.

14. There is a growing demand to support South-South cooperation at the regional, subregional and interregional levels. These types of collaboration constitute an important aspect of partnership among the countries of the South. In the Nairobi outcome document, Member States called for the strengthening of interregional dialogue and the exchange of experience among subregional and regional economic groupings for the purpose of expanding South-South cooperation.

15. The United Nations system continues to enhance its support for South-South and triangular collaboration by mainstreaming South-South cooperation into the policy frameworks and operations that are aimed at assisting in the implementation of the 2030 Agenda. United Nations agencies, funds and programmes are also increasingly allocating dedicated funds and human resources to boost their South-South cooperation initiatives at the headquarters, country and regional levels. However, there is a need to better coordinate and mainstream United Nations support for South-South cooperation and triangular cooperation towards achieving the 2030 Agenda.

III. Proposed overarching theme and sub-themes

16. The proposed overarching theme of the Conference and the four proposed sub-themes for the interactive panel discussions are set out below.

A. Overarching theme

Role of South-South cooperation and the implementation of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development: challenges and opportunities

17. South-South cooperation is already playing a key role in achieving the Sustainable Development Goals, and significant efforts are being made by Member States, the United Nations and other stakeholders to enhance the contribution of South-South cooperation to sustainable development.

18. The objective of the Conference is to identify challenges and opportunities and to address ways of strengthening the institutional framework for South-South cooperation in order to effectively scale up such cooperation and to harness its potential and impact in the context of the implementation of the 2030 Agenda.

19. Approaches and policies have been put in place by Member States at the national and regional levels, as well as by the United Nations system and other stakeholders, to bolster the role of South-South cooperation in building inclusive sustainable development.

B. Sub-theme 1

Comparative advantages and opportunities of South-South cooperation

20. South-South cooperation has proved effective in many areas, such as capacity-building, policy coordination, regional integration, interregional linkages, infrastructure interconnectivity and the development of national productive capacities through exchanges of knowledge and technological innovation.

21. The Conference will provide an opportunity to identify new areas in which South-South cooperation and triangular cooperation can add value and have more impact.

C. Sub-theme 2**Challenges and the strengthening of the institutional framework of South-South cooperation and triangular cooperation**

22. At the Conference, participants will emphasize the nature and principles of South-South cooperation.

23. They will also consider the nature and principles of triangular cooperation.

24. In the past decades, a number of countries have established and developed governmental agencies or departments for South-South cooperation that continue to evolve; others are just beginning to set up such institutional arrangements. The Conference will provide an opportunity to explore ways to create enabling environments for the further institutionalization of South-South cooperation.

25. Given the evolving global context and the potential of South-South cooperation, the Conference will also serve to address the strengthening of the institutional framework for South-South cooperation.

26. Reporting on South-South cooperation and triangular cooperation at the national and regional levels, on a voluntary basis and in accordance with national capacities, will be necessary in order to follow up on the implementation of South-South cooperation for sustainable development.

27. At the Conference, participants will examine approaches to enhancing the United Nations system-wide coordination mechanism on South-South cooperation.

D. Sub-theme 3**Sharing of experiences, best practices and success stories**

28. At the Conference, participants will explore the best approaches to mapping and documenting good practices in South-South cooperation and triangular cooperation, as well as the dissemination and sharing of innovative development solutions from the countries of the South.

29. They will examine South-South cooperation as a critical instrument for deepening regional cooperation and integration towards achieving sustainable development. South-South interregional cooperation frameworks are also relevant forums for furthering sustainable development in many regions of the world.

E. Sub-theme 4**Scaling up the means of implementation of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development in support of South-South cooperation and triangular cooperation**

30. At the Conference, participants will enhance South-South and triangular partnerships with the involvement of all stakeholders, including the private sector, civil society, academia, think tanks and the philanthropic sector.

31. They will underscore the role of triangular cooperation and how to leverage the contributions of wider actors and resources in overcoming common challenges.

32. They will also highlight the importance of enhancing regional and international South-South cooperation and triangular cooperation in science, technology transfer and innovation, and of increasing the exchange of knowledge on mutually agreed terms.

33. Recognizing that South-South cooperation could encompass more than technical cooperation and capacity development, participants will emphasize trade, investment, infrastructure and technological exchanges among developing countries and the role, commitments and responsibilities of developed countries in the current development context.

IV. Conclusion

34. The second High-level United Nations Conference on South-South Cooperation should provide momentum for concerted and cooperative action, through partnerships among all stakeholders, to bolster the role of South-South cooperation for the implementation of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development.
